Trademarks and Digital Goods by McKenna, Mark & Osborn, Lucas S.
Notre Dame Law School
NDLScholarship
Journal Articles Publications
2017
Trademarks and Digital Goods
Mark McKenna
Notre Dame Law School, markmckenna@nd.edu
Lucas S. Osborn
Campbell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark McKenna & Lucas S. Osborn, Trademarks and Digital Goods, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1425 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1310
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 92 | Issue 4 Article 2
5-2017
Trademarks and Digital Goods
Mark P. McKenna
Notre Dame Law School
Lucas S. Osborn
Campbell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
92 Notre Dame L. Rev 1425 (2017)
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 1 11-MAY-17 8:59
TRADEMARKS  AND  DIGITAL  GOODS
Mark P. McKenna* & Lucas S. Osborn**
BMW recently sued online virtual modeling company TurboSquid for
selling digital models of BMW vehicles.1  TurboSquid allows artists to upload
to its web site and offer for sale a wide range of digital models,2 and there are
currently dozens of 3D models of cars available on the site, many from recog-
nizable brands:
FIGURE 1
© 2017 Mark P. McKenna & Lucas S. Osborn.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Professor of Law, and Notre Dame
Presidential Fellow, Notre Dame Law School.
** Associate Professor of Law, Campbell Law School.  Thanks to Jeanne Fromer, Joe
Liu, David Olson, Chris Sprigman, Rebecca Tushnet, Fred Yen, and participants at a faculty
workshop at the Boston College Law School for helpful discussions of the ideas in this
paper, and to Cody Corbin for excellent research assistance.
1 Complaint at 1, BMW of N. Am., LLC v. TurboSquid, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-02500
(D.N.J. May 3, 2016).  The case was dismissed, presumably after the parties reached some
settlement.  Notice of Dismissal at 1, BMW, No. 2:16-CV-02500 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2016).  Our
searches of the TurboSquid website just after the dismissal suggested that TurboSquid had
removed all virtual models of BMW vehicles from the website.
2 Company History, TURBOSQUID, http://www.turbosquid.com/history (last visited Jan.
24, 2017).
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Purchasers of the digital models typically use them as inputs for video
games, news reporting, commercials, and movies.3  Some of the models avail-
able for sale on TurboSquid’s site can be 3D printed by the purchaser.4
According to BMW, TurboSquid’s “marketing of 3-D virtual models” of BMW
vehicles for use in video games infringed BMW’s trademarks and trade dress,
in addition to its design patents.5  With respect to its trademark claims, BMW
alleged that the sale of digital models of BMW cars, complete with BMW
logos, was likely to confuse consumers about the source of those digital mod-
els, or about whether BMW had licensed TurboSquid to sell models of its
vehicles.
BMW’s case is the latest in a growing number of trademark cases dealing
with uses in the digital environment.  Some of those cases raise issues with
which trademark law has long wrestled—cases like E.S.S. Entertainment 2000,
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., in which the owners of the Play Pen Gentlemen’s
Club claimed the defendant’s digital depiction of the “Pig Pen” strip club in
the Grand Theft Auto video game infringed its rights in its Play Pen mark.6
E.S.S. happened to involve a digital work (a video game), but it raised famil-
iar questions about the circumstances in which use of a trademark within an
expressive work can give rise to liability.7  Other cases implicate the trade-
mark/copyright boundary, raising concerns about trademark law’s overlap,
or interference with copyright—cases like Marvel Enterprises, Inc. v. NCSoft
Corp., in which Marvel claimed that the defendant’s inclusion in its video
game of a superhero character called “Statesman” infringed its copyright and
trademark rights in Captain America.8  Many of these latter cases implicate
the Supreme Court’s Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. decision,
which held that only confusion about the origin of tangible goods (and not
about the origin of intangible content) is relevant for purposes of Lanham
Act claims.9
But BMW’s case against TurboSquid has a somewhat different flavor
because that claim related not to the inclusion of digital BMWs in a digital
work, but to the sales of the files themselves.10  And there are reasons to
think these types of claims may be more common in the future, as a variety of
goods that consumers once would have purchased in physical form are
3 About TurboSquid: Behind the Largest 3D Model Library in the World, TURBOSQUID, http:/
/www.turbosquid.com/AboutTurboSquid (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
4 Are TurboSquid Models 3D Printable?, TURBOSQUID, https://support.turbosquid.com/
entries/92883838–Are–TurboSquid–models–3d–printable (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
5 Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
6 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).
7 See, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013).
8 Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCSoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253, 2005 WL 878090, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 9, 2005) (dismissing the trademark claims on motion to dismiss).
9 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
10 Cf. Complaint at 5, Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Linden Research, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00811 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 17, 2009) (alleging trademark infringement for selling digital versions of plain-
tiff’s weapons in the Second Life virtual world where plaintiff’s trademarks were for physi-
cal weapons).
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increasingly beamed to computers and phones as digital files.11  Media prod-
ucts are the most obvious examples here.  Music once purchased on vinyl,
eight–tracks, audio cassettes, or CDs is now downloaded or streamed from
the cloud.12  Movies once rented or purchased on Betamax/VHS tapes or
DVDs are likewise downloaded or streamed.13  And software once purchased
on floppy disks (5.25 inch, then 3.5 inch) or CDs is now downloaded directly
or, in some cases, provided as “software as a service,” in which applications
11 The tangibility of digital files has been the subject of much discussion.  The file in
the abstract, as data, is intangible. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
207 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“[C]omputer data, software and systems are not
‘tangible’ property in the common sense understanding of the word.  The plain and ordi-
nary meaning of the term ‘tangible’ is property that can be touched.  Computer data,
software and systems are incapable of perception by any of the senses and are therefore
intangible.”).  The memory medium on which the file is stored, however, is tangible. See,
e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 441–42 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding in the
copyright context that a video game was fixed in a tangible medium, as required by the
copyright statute, when stored on a memory device); James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such
Thing as a Computer-Authored Work—And It’s a Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403,
405 (2016) (“Bits may be abstract and intangible, but memory chips and hard drives are
very much ‘material objects.’”).
12 See, e.g., DELOITTE, DIGITAL MEDIA: RISE OF ON-DEMAND CONTENT 5–7, https://
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documents/technology-media-telecommu-
nications/in-tmt-rise-of-on-demand-content.pdf.  Interestingly, records and cassette tapes
have regained popularity in some quarters precisely because of their tangibility. See Lee
Barron, Opinion, Why Vinyl Has Made a Comeback, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 18, 2015), http://www
.newsweek.com/why-vinyl-has-made-comeback-323135 (“Vinyl not only sounds different,
but it also has a possessive quality that intangible downloads and streaming lacks. . . . An LP
is an object and one that comes with a certain ‘ritual’ behaviour.”); Jason Evangelho, Forget
Vinyl, Let’s Talk About the Cassette Comeback, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/jasonevangelho/2016/03/24/forget-vinyl-lets-talk-about-the-cassette-come-
back/#6d3183801723 (detailing increasing cassette tape popularity, due in part to music
lovers’ desire for tangibility).
13 As we discuss at greater length below, media products in some ways presaged the
burgeoning challenges with digital goods, as movies and music have long been “con-
sumed” in nonphysical form, as when consumers watch movies in theaters or receive con-
tent through audio and television broadcasts delivered over the air via analog signals.
Audiences received these broadcasts essentially for free, paid for either via advertisements
or government subsidies. See Walt-West Enters., Inc. v. Gannett Co., 695 F.2d 1050, 1061
(7th Cir. 1982) (“[R]adio listeners are not the radio stations’ customers, but rather, they
(or their collective attention) are its product.  The radio stations’ customers are the adver-
tisers who pay the stations to broadcast commercial messages to the listeners.”).  Trade-
mark law struggled to determine how to treat uses of trademarks in connection with those
broadcasts for some time, precisely because their intangibility frustrated trademark law’s
traditional orientation to physical goods. See id. Other than trade names of businesses,
which could be thought of as a type of service mark, service marks were not generally
protectable until the mid-twentieth century. See James M. Treece, Developments in the Law of
Trademarks and Service Marks—Contributions of the Common Law, the Federal Act, State Statutes
and the Restatement of Torts, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 895 (1970) (“Prior to 1946 the term
service mark had not appeared in common law decisions and prior trademark acts had not
mentioned it.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 4 11-MAY-17 8:59
1428 notre dame law review [vol. 92:4
are stored remotely in the cloud and dispersed users utilize the program
through interfaces on their individual computers.14
But in a world in which 3D printing technology is becoming main-
stream, this phenomenon will not be limited to media products.  Indeed, 3D
printing technology makes possible the digitization of nearly any product
that can be conceived.15  No longer must consumers purchase physical items
like toys, tools, or even handbags.  Rather, they can create or obtain digital
files containing 3D printing instructions and print the items in their homes
or anywhere they have access to a 3D printer.16  From trademark law’s per-
spective, the significant point is that 3D printing technology radically sepa-
rates the design and production processes.  Trademarks have traditionally
been understood to indicate the source of goods’ production, but produc-
tion and design typically went hand-in-hand.  In a 3D printing world, design
can be done by anyone with access to a CAD program, and production can
take place anywhere there is a 3D printer, including an individual’s home.
That separation has potentially destabilizing consequences for trade-
mark law, which has overwhelmingly been oriented toward indications of the
origin of physical goods.17  For one thing, digitization brings much more of
trademark law into contact with Dastar, raising difficult questions about
whether, and under what circumstances, digital files count as “goods” for
Lanham Act purposes.  More broadly, a world of increasing digitization
implicates important concerns about the boundaries of trademark law vis-a`-
14 See IT Glossary: Software as a Service (SaaS), GARTNER, http://www.gartner.com/it-glos-
sary/software-as-a-service-saas (last visited Jan. 24, 2017) (“Gartner defines software as a
service (SaaS) as software that is owned, delivered and managed remotely by one or more
providers.  The provider delivers software based on one set of common code and data
definitions that is consumed in a one-to-many model by all contracted customers at any-
time on a pay-for-use basis or as a subscription based on use metrics.”).
15 Also called additive manufacturing or rapid prototyping, 3D printing works by addi-
tively building a product layer by layer.  Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Print-
ing: The Converging Worlds of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 559 (2014).  For
more on 3D printing technology, see generally HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED:
THE NEW WORLD OF 3D PRINTING 103 (2013); Lucas S. Osborn et al., A Case for Weakening
Patent Rights, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1185 (2015).
16 3D printing technology involves several file formats.  CAD files are the design files,
which are usually converted into a 3D printing file like STL files before printing.  Lucas S.
Osborn, The Limits of Creativity: Copyright, CAD Files, and Lockout Codes, 4 TEX. A&M J. PROP.
L. (forthcoming 2017).  Users can create a CAD file from scratch by drawing it in a CAD
program, scan an existing physical object with a 3D scanner, or download CAD files from
the internet.  Osborn, supra note 15, at 559.
17 3D printing and other similar technologies have potentially significant implications
for other areas of IP as well. See Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent
Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319 (2015) (analyzing 3D
printing and patent infringement); Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 460 (2015); Lucas S. Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public: Three-Dimen-
sional Printing Technology and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811 (2014) (analyzing 3D print-
ing and copyright law).
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vis other areas of IP law, and it raises profound questions about the meaning
of source indication and the role of trademark law in the digital world.
We argue that the question of whether we should treat digital files as
relevant goods is irreducibly one of policy, and it should not be reduced to
mere formalism.  Digital files should be treated as goods only when consum-
ers’ interactions with the files sufficiently resemble their interactions with
physical goods that they warrant the same treatment.  In particular, we argue
that digital files should be treated as goods only when the origin of the files
as such (not the content of those files) is material to consumers.  That, we
argue, may turn out to be relatively rare.  Indeed, we suggest that a world of
greater digitization might well be a world in which trademark law has less
relevance relative to design patent and copyright.
I. DOCTRINAL CHALLENGES
The TurboSquid website contains digital models of numerous branded
products, including Hermes and Luis Vuitton handbags, Rolex watches, and
Nike shoes.  A shopper looking for an image of a Rolex watch, for example,
would look in the collection of “Watch 3D Models.”  After clicking on a par-
ticular watch image, the shopper would reach a page with multiple images of
the watch from various angles.  That page prominently displays the name of
the object depicted in the image (often by brand name) as well as the name
of the artist who created the model (JGCosta, in the image below):
FIGURE 2
These kinds of uses raise a series of difficult doctrinal questions.  What
role does the Rolex mark play here?  Does it indicate the source of the digital
model?  Or would the shopper instead assume that the artist identified under
the name of the product created the model?  After all, the artist is the source
of the digital model, even if Rolex is (presumably) the source of the watch’s
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design.18  What if, as in the iPad example below, the page displaying the
digital model includes a clear statement that “[t]he intellectual property
depicted in this model, including the brand ‘apple,’ is not affiliated with or
endorsed by the original rights holders and must be used under editorial use
restrictions”?
FIGURE 3
19
Most importantly for our purposes, even if users would assume that
Rolex (or Apple) created, or at least licensed, the digital models, is that
assumption legally relevant?  Are digital models “goods” for purposes of the
Lanham Act?  Does the labeling of the digital models with the name “Rolex
Submariner Date” or “iPad Pro Silver” matter to that determination?
A. Dastar and the Definition of “Goods”
These kinds of digital trademark uses run headlong into the Supreme
Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., which held
that “origin of goods,” for purposes of the Lanham Act, refers only to the
origin of tangible goods; it does not, and cannot be understood, to refer to
the origin of intangible creative content.20
Dastar involved the unattributed use of public domain material from a
television series that was based on President Dwight Eisenhower’s book Cru-
sade in Europe.21 Though the book remained in copyright, Twentieth Cen-
18 In reality, it’s unclear whether Rolex itself designed the watch or if it instead may
have hired a design firm to do so.  But in the physical world, that distinction doesn’t mat-
ter, because we assume that Rolex stands behind the quality of the produced watch, which
embodies the design.
19 iPad Pro Silver, TURBOSQUID, https://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/ipad-pro-sil-
ver-max/962813 (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
20 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31–38 (2003).
21 Id. at 25–26.
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tury Fox failed to renew the copyright on the television series, thereby
inadvertently allowing it to fall into the public domain.22  Dastar edited foot-
age from the television series and added some new material to make its
“World War II Campaigns in Europe” video set.23  Neither Dastar’s advertis-
ing nor the videos themselves made any reference to Fox or to the Crusade
television series;24 instead Dastar advertised the series as having been “Pro-
duced and Distributed by: Entertainment Distributing,” a Dastar subsidiary.25
Fox claimed that Dastar was passing off Fox’s content as though it were
Dastar’s own, thereby falsely designating the origin of the video series in vio-
lation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.26  This was not a fanciful claim—
indeed, there was some precedent for reverse passing off claims of this sort.
Not only had the Ninth Circuit allowed reverse passing off claims in cases of
“bodily appropriation” of a creative work,27 the Second Circuit recognized
reverse passing off claims in cases in which the defendant’s unauthorized
work was “substantially similar” to the plaintiff’s, borrowing the test of copy-
right infringement.28  Some commentators continue to endorse these claims
even after Dastar.29
22 Id. at 26.
23 Id. at 26–27 (“To make Campaigns, Dastar purchased eight beta cam tapes of the
original version of the Crusade television series, which is in the public domain, copied
them, and then edited the series.  Dastar’s Campaigns series is slightly more than half as
long as the original Crusade television series.  Dastar substituted a new opening sequence,
credit page, and final closing for those of the Crusade television series; inserted new chap-
ter-title sequences and narrated chapter introductions; moved the ‘recap’ in the Crusade
television series to the beginning and retitled it as a ‘preview’; and removed references to
and images of the book.  Dastar created new packaging for its Campaigns series and (as
already noted) a new title.”).
24 Id. at 27.
25 Id.
26 Id.  That section makes actionable the use of
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or mislead-
ing representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such per-
son with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
27 See, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994); Summit Mach.
Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1436–37 (9th Cir. 1993).  Slight
modifications to the material were not sufficient to avoid liability. See id. at 1437 (“A defen-
dant may also be guilty of reverse palming off by selling or offering for sale another’s
product that has been modified slightly and then labeled with a different name.” (quoting
Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1990))).
28 See, e.g., Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 782–84 (2d Cir. 1994)
(using the copyright infringement test as the test for determining false designation of ori-
gin under the Lanham Act); Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836, 841–45
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
29 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trade-
marks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263 (2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Distinguishing Dastar: Con-
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected Fox’s claim, concerned about
the implications for copyright law if Lanham Act claims were allowed in these
settings.  Since the material Dastar copied had fallen into the public domain,
the Court insisted that Dastar had an unqualified right to use it, even without
attribution.30  But the Court’s concerns were not limited to claims involving
public domain material, and it therefore did not rest its holding on the status
of the material Dastar copied.  Instead the Court resolved the case by inter-
preting the phrase “origin of goods” in section 43(a) to mean to “the pro-
ducer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace.”31
The concept of origin “might be stretched,” the Court allowed, “to
include not only the actual producer,” but the party who “(‘stood behind’)
production of the physical product.”32  But “origin” is “incapable of connot-
ing the person or entity that originated the ideas or communications that
‘goods’ embody or contain.”33  “Goods” are definitively physical objects.
It’s not that the Court didn’t recognize that the intellectual origins of
creative works might be relevant to consumers.  As the Court said, “The pur-
chaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, in the identity of the pro-
ducer of the physical tome (the publisher), but also, and indeed primarily, in
the identity of the creator of the story it conveys (the author).”34  The Court
simply held that indications of the origins of intangible works are irrelevant
to trademark law.  It did so because “according special treatment to communi-
cative products . . . causes the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of copy-
right, which addresses that subject specifically.”35  Indeed, allowing a cause of
sumer Protection, Moral Rights and Section 43(a), in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE
‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 121 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
30 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33.
31 Id. at 31.
32 Id. at 31–32.  Here, the Court presumably meant to acknowledge that “source” and
“origin” in modern trademark law include parties who did not themselves produce the
goods, but who have sponsored or are affiliated with the actual producer or its goods.
Notably, however, the Court referred to those parties as “standing behind” the physical
good, a formulation that suggests a somewhat narrower understanding of “sponsorship”
and “affiliation” than lower courts have generally accepted. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark
McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010) (arguing for a narrower inter-
pretation of sponsorship or affiliation, one focused on responsibility for quality of goods).
Regardless, allegations of “sponsorship” or “affiliation” confusion regarding intangible
content merit the same treatment as those regarding “origin,” lest such claims undermine
Dastar’s central holding.
33 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32.
34 Id. at 33 (“For such a communicative product (the argument goes) ‘origin of goods’
in § 43(a) must be deemed to include not merely the producer of the physical item . . . but
also the creator of the content that the physical item conveys . . . .”).
35 Id.  As one of us has previously explained, a rule requiring attribution of intellectual
origin would allow claimants to evade the functionality doctrine in the context of physical
goods, and it would potentially enable Coca-Cola to assert a claim against a party that
reverse engineered Coca-Cola and sold that product under its own name, a result that
would undermine an important limit in trade secret law. See Mark P. McKenna, Dastar’s
Next Stand, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357, 370–73 (2012); see also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37 (noting
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action under section 43(a) for misrepresentation of the origin of creative
content “would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the pub-
lic’s ‘federal right to copy and to use’ expired copyrights.”36
The Court also had pragmatic concerns about an interpretation of “ori-
gin” that would include the creator of expressive content.37  Because many
creative works are highly collaborative, and because many of those contribu-
tors are often invisible to consumers, efforts to identify the “true” intellectual
origin(s) of creative content could degenerate into absurdity.
In many cases, figuring out who is in the line of “origin” would be no simple
task.  Indeed, in the present case it is far from clear that respondents have
that status.  Neither SFM nor New Line had anything to do with the produc-
tion of the Crusade television series—they merely were licensed to distribute
the video version.  While Fox might have a claim to being in the line of
origin, its involvement with the creation of the television series was limited at
best.  Time, Inc., was the principal, if not the exclusive, creator, albeit under
arrangement with Fox.  And of course it was neither Fox nor Time, Inc., that
shot the film used in the Crusade television series.  Rather, that footage
came from the United States Army, Navy, and Coast Guard, the British Min-
istry of Information and War Office, the National Film Board of Canada, and
unidentified “Newsreel Pool Cameramen.”  If anyone has a claim to being
the original creator of the material used in both the Crusade television series
and the Campaigns videotapes, it would be those groups, rather than Fox.38
As the Court said, the Lanham Act does not require a “search for the source
of the Nile and all its tributaries.”39
Perhaps most significantly, the Court clearly felt that Fox’s claim put
Dastar in an impossible double bind: Fox claimed that Dastar falsely desig-
nated the origin of its video series because it had failed to attribute the con-
tent, but there was a real risk, under another line of cases, that Dastar would
that, were reverse passing off claims directed at intellectual origins not barred, the “plain-
tiff [in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001)], whose patents on
flexible road signs had expired, and who could not prevail on a trade dress claim under
§ 43(a) because the features of the signs were functional, would have had a reverse-passing-
off claim for unattributed copying of his design.”).
36 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989)).
37 See id. at 35–36.
38 Id. at 35.  Commentators have criticized this logic on the ground that trademark law
is not generally concerned with the identities of actual contributors to a product; it is
instead concerned only with legal source (the entity responsible for quality). See Laura A.
Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1442 (2005) (“[T]rademark law does not concern itself with the
actual source of any good or service (or its progenitors). . . . [but] concerns itself with
maintaining the integrity of the organizational system.”).  As one of us has explained else-
where, while there is something to that criticism, it is unfair on the facts of Dastar. See
McKenna, supra note 35, at 372–73.
39 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36.
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have been exposed to a claim under section 43(a) if it had attributed.40  That
is to say that an attribution requirement quickly becomes an effective mea-
sure of control over content, since the only way to avoid liability is to seek
permission.41
Ultimately, the Court’s construction of “origin of goods” was fatal to
Fox’s claim because there was no doubt that Dastar (and not Fox) was the
actual source of its physical videotapes, even if Dastar was not the source of
the footage embodied in those tapes.  Thus, when it designated the source of
its tapes with its own name, Dastar was not falsely designating their origin: It
was telling the truth.  Consistent with its emphasis on physicality, however,
the Court insisted that Fox’s claim of reverse passing off “would undoubtedly
[have been] sustained if Dastar had bought some of New Line’s Crusade vide-
otapes and merely repackaged them as its own.”42  In that case, Dastar would
have been misrepresenting the origin of the physical tapes.
A number of courts have read Dastar to bar false designation of origin
claims where the claims were based on the defendant’s misattribution of
intellectual origin.43  Courts have even relied on Dastar to bar false advertis-
40 See id. (“On the one hand, [Dastar] would face Lanham Act liability for failing to
credit the creator of a work on which their lawful copies are based; and on the other hand
they could face Lanham Act liability for crediting the creator if that should be regarded as
implying the creator’s ‘sponsorship or approval’ of the copy.” (alteration in original)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012))); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Concurrence
and Convergence of Rights: The Concerns of the U.S. Supreme Court, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 2004: ARTICLES ON CROSSING BORDERS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND ACTUAL 5, 20 (F.
Willem Grosheide & Jan J. Brinkhof eds., 2005) (noting the “risk of being sued no matter
what attribution strategy [one follows]”); Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing
the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 682; Michael Landau, Dastar v. Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox: The Need for Stronger Protection of Attribution Rights in the United States, 61 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273, 303 (2005) (“Although it sounds cliche´, bad facts do make bad law.
In Dastar, the facts were terrible; they presented the quintessential ‘damned if you do,
damned if you don’t’ conundrum.  At first blush, it seems that Dastar probably would have
been sued for ‘false designation of origin’ under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act whether
it gave credit to Twentieth Century Fox or not.”).
41 Compare Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781–84 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding failing to credit the original creator of the work that is subsequently modified is
actionable as reverse passing off), with Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 23–25 (2d
Cir. 1976) (that crediting the original creator of the work that is subsequently modified is
actionable as passing off).  Professor Lunney argues that this dilemma can be averted by
requiring “proper labeling.”  Lunney, supra note 29, at 124.  But as these cases reflect,
“proper” labeling is in the eye of the beholder, and the plaintiff never thinks the labeling
was proper. Cf. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36 (“[I]t is hard to have confidence in [Fox’s] assurance
that they ‘would not be here on a Lanham Act cause of action’” if “Dastar had simply
‘copied [the television series] as Crusade in Europe and sold it as Crusade in Europe,’
without changing the title or packaging (including the original credits to Fox).” (third
alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Dastar, 539 U.S. 23
(No. 02-428))).
42 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31.
43 See, e.g., Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc., 796 F.3d 576,
587–88 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding plaintiff’s reverse passing off claim barred by Dastar when
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ing claims where the allegedly false statement related to the “origin” of con-
tent,44 despite the fact that Dastar itself expressly left the door open to some
types of false advertising claims in cases in which the alleged falsity is not
about origin.45
But in general courts have been somewhat inconsistent in applying Das-
tar, in part because they have sometimes had difficulty accepting its central
holding.  In Gensler v. Strabala, for example, the architectural firm Gensler
sued Strabala, its former employee, for reverse passing off when Strabala
claimed to have designed five buildings for which Gensler had been the
architect of record.46  The district court had dismissed the complaint on the
ground that Dastar limited section 43(a) claims to false designation of the
origin of goods, while Gensler’s claim concerned designation of the origin of
plaintiff alleged that defendant was manufacturing and selling “cloned” products under
defendant’s own name; noting that “[t]aking tangible goods and reselling them as your
own constitutes a Lanham Act violation; taking the intellectual property contained in those
goods and incorporating it into your own goods does not” (quoting Stolle Mach. Co. v.
RAM Precision Indus., 605 F. App’x 473, 487 (6th Cir. 2015))); Romero v. Buhimschi, 396
F. App’x 224 (6th Cir. 2010) (rejecting false designation of origin claim based on denial of
authorship credit); Nat’l Bus. Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Am. Credit Educ. & Consulting, Inc., 299
F. App’x 509 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting plaintiff’s Lanham Act claims for incorporating
copyrighted materials into defendant’s own materials); Zyla v. Wadsworth, Div. of Thom-
son Corp., 360 F.3d 243, 251–52 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding Lanham Act claims for failing to
attribute authorship of college textbook barred by Dastar); Dorchen/Martin Assocs., Inc. v.
Brook of Cheboygan, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 607 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s false
designation of origin claim where the defendant’s alleged use of a design for an assisted
living facility was based on a design the plaintiff had presented to the defendant and which
the plaintiff did not authorize the defendant to reuse); Dutch Jackson IATG, LLC v. Bas-
ketball Mktg. Co., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (barring plaintiff’s claim that was
based on defendants’ use of the plaintiff’s musical work as part of the soundtrack to a
basketball DVD).
44 See, e.g., Kehoe, 796 F.3d at 586–89 (rejecting plaintiff’s false advertising claim under
Dastar because plaintiff alleged only false representation of the intellectual origin of the
goods); Romero, 396 F. App’x at 224; Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc., 556 F.3d 1300,
1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting the false advertising claim based on defendant’s claim that
its basketball technology was “innovative” on the ground that claim was “fundamentally
about the origin of an idea”); Dutch Jackson, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 (rejecting the plain-
tiff’s false advertising claim on the ground that characterizing defendant’s inclusion of the
musical work as an implicit misrepresentation of the originality of the work (its “nature
and characteristics”) was an “impermissible work-around” of Dastar); ZS Assocs., Inc. v.
Synygy, Inc., No. 10-4274, 2011 WL 2038513 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s
false advertising claims that were based on allegedly false attribution in a press release of
the authorship of “sales performance management solutions”).
45 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38 (“If, moreover, the producer of a video that substantially cop-
ied the Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the impression
that the video was quite different from that series, then one or more of the respondents
might have a cause of action—not for reverse passing off under the ‘confusion . . . as to the
origin’ provision of § 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the ‘misrepresents the
nature, characteristics [or] qualities’ provision of § 43(a)(1)(B).” (alterations in original)).
46 M. Arthur Gensler Jr. & Assocs. v. Strabala, 764 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 2014).
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services.47  Though it ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s claim on confusion
grounds, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court on the Dastar
issue, noting that, while the Supreme Court “held that the absence of a false
or misleading designation of goods’ origin nixed a Lanham Act claim, [ ]
that was because the suit involved only goods.  The Supreme Court did not
read ‘services’ out of the Lanham Act.”48
That conclusion was undoubtedly correct, as far as it went—Dastar did
not directly address services, a blind spot for which it has fairly been criti-
cized.49  But the Seventh Circuit went further, attempting to distinguish Das-
tar on the basis of what was designated.  Regarding Fox’s claim:
Dastar correctly identified itself as the producer of the physical objects that
embodied the intellectual property; doing so satisfied both statutes, the
Court held.  Twentieth Century Fox, which had owned the copyright before
its expiration, did not contend that Dastar had falsely identified itself as the
videos’ creator, wrongly imputed the newly made copies to Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox, or made any other false claim.  Because the origin of goods had
been correctly designated, and no false statement made, the Court held that
§ 43(a) did not supply a claim for relief.50
Gensler’s claim was different, according to the court, because, unlike Fox,
Gensler “d[id] assert there ha[d] been a false claim of origin—though of
services rather than goods.  Gensler maintain[ed] that Strabala falsely
claim[ed] to have been the creator of intellectual property (the designs of
the five buildings).”51
But that distinction depends on a mischaracterization of Dastar.  Fox
most certainly did allege that Dastar had falsely identified itself as the (intan-
gible) video content’s creator—indeed, that was the entire basis of Fox’s
claim.  The Supreme Court simply concluded that designation of the origin
of the intangible content was irrelevant, because only designation of the ori-
gin of the physical videotapes matters for Lanham Act purposes.  Gensler’s
claim cannot be distinguished on the ground that it alleged false designation
of the origin of content.
Nor can Dastar be distinguished on the ground that it did not involve
services.  The central point of the Dastar decision was that “origin” cannot
47 Id.
48 Id.  The Seventh Circuit also said that Dastar did not hold “that a false claim of
origin is the only way to violate § 43(a).” Id.  While it is undoubtedly true that false desig-
nation of origin is not the only way to violate section 43(a), the court’s citation of POM
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014), a false advertising case, suggests it
was unclear about the relationship between section 43(a)(1)(A) and section 43(a)(1)(B).
As the Seventh Circuit acknowledged, there was no dispute in POM Wonderful “about who
made what, as opposed to whether one seller was trying to deceive consumers about what
its product contained.”  Gensler, 764 F.3d at 736–37.  Which is to say that POM Wonderful
was not about designation of origin.
49 See Mary LaFrance, When You Wish Upon Dastar: Creative Provenance and the Lanham
Act, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 197, 244–46 (2005); Lunney, supra note 29, at 132–33.
50 Gensler, 764 F.3d at 737.
51 Id.
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refer to the creator of intangible content.52 Whatever the significance of the
goods/services distinction, it beggars the imagination to suggest that the
Court’s animating concern (about use of the Lanham Act to claim author-
ship) is irrelevant if the plaintiff can characterize its claim as one relating to
services.53
Indeed, a number of other courts have recognized that Dastar bars
claims of false attribution even where services are involved,54 and Professor
McCarthy concurs, describing the Gensler opinion as “perplexing” because it
“seems to say that Dastar was not a bar to a case in which plaintiff alleged that
defendant ‘falsely claims to have been the creator of intellectual property
(the designs of the five buildings).’  Such a claim would appear to be clearly
52 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003)
(“Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar’s representation of itself as the ‘Producer’
of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the
videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for that representation would create a
species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s ‘federal right to “copy and to use”’
expired copyrights” (emphasis added) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989))).
53 The Gensler court justified its holding by noting that “[a]rchitects’ success in win-
ning clients depends on what they have accomplished; Gensler has a strong interest in
defending its reputation for creativity and preventing a false claim that someone else did
the design work.”  Gensler, 764 F.3d at 737.  But Dastar recognized the authorial attribution
interest explicitly, and it nevertheless held that the Lanham Act does not provide a remedy
for reverse passing off. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (“And the author, of course, has at least as
much interest in avoiding passing off (or reverse passing off) of his creation as does the
publisher.”).
54 See, e.g., Romero v. Buhimschi, 396 F. App’x 224, 233 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that
“any advertising or promotional claim” by a research team that omitted attribution to co-
researcher was barred by Dastar because it “related to authorship, rather than the nature,
characteristics, or qualities of the research”); Logan Developers, Inc. v. Heritage Bldgs.,
Inc., No. 7:12-CV-323, 2013 WL 5460757 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013) (holding that home
designer’s alleged copying of plaintiff’s blueprints and failure to attribute plaintiff was not
actionable under Dastar); Sidem, S.A. v. Aquatech Int’l Corp., No. 10-81, 2010 WL
2573882, at *8 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2010) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to evade Dastar by
characterizing its claim as one regarding the origin of services, noting, “The Supreme
Court’s concern in Dastar was the potential conflict with copyright or patent law.  Plaintiffs’
claim under § 43(a)(1)(B), regardless of its characterization as one involving goods, ser-
vices, or commercial activities, implicates that same concern highlighted by the Supreme
Court noting,”); Tao of Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Servs. & Materials, Inc., 299 F.
Supp. 2d 565, 572 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding that defendant’s taking credit for engineering
services provided by plaintiff was not actionable under the Lanham Act); Carroll v. Kahn,
No. 03-CV-0656, 2003 WL 22327299, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2003) (“Defendants are
accused only of failing to identify someone who contributed not goods, but ideas or com-
munications (or, for that matter, ‘services’) to Defendants’ product.” (emphasis added));
Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“Plaintiff
[an alleged contributor to a movie] contends that his claim survives Dastar because he
provided ‘services’ as opposed to ‘goods.’  However, to the contrary, his claim fails for this
reason.”).
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barred by the Dastar rule.).”55  The Seventh Circuit simply was unwilling to
accept the implications of Dastar.56
Other courts have similarly struggled with Dastar’s basic holding.  In
Masck v. Sports Illustrated,57 Masck, a photographer, alleged that third parties
engaged in reverse passing off when they made copies of his photos without
permission and failed to attribute the photos to him.58  Despite the case’s
clear similarity to Dastar, the Masck court refused to grant a motion to dismiss
because it was “not ready . . . to conclude that Plaintiff’s photo [was] an
intangible item.”59  The court particularly focused on the fact that the plain-
tiff sold tangible copies of his photos and that the defendants were also sell-
ing tangible goods.60  Of course the same was true in Dastar—both Fox’s and
Dastar’s movies were sold in tangible form.  And in Masck the defendants
truly were the origin of the tangible photos they were selling, just as Dastar
was truly the origin of its tapes.61
55 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,
§ 27:78.30, n.5 (4th ed. 2016).  Nor does it matter, as the Gensler court suggested, that
Strabala did not make or sell copies of any plans or drawings in which Gensler claimed a
copyright matter.  The fact that “[a] false claim of authorship, without the making of cop-
ies (or some other act covered by 17 U.S.C. § 106), is outside the scope of copyright law”
does not make false designation of origin a viable claim. Gensler, 764 F.3d at 737
(“Gensler’s only plausible federal claim rests on § 43(a).”).  The Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of section 43(a) ruled out claims based on false claims of authorship; the holding
did not depend on whether there was a viable copyright claim available.  Indeed, Fox did
not have a viable copyright claim as to the film.  Nor did the lack of a copyright claim
matter in Romero v. Buhimschi, 396 F. App’x. 224 (6th Cir. 2010), where the court barred
the advertising/promotional claim based on a research group’s taking full credit for
research services to which the plaintiff allegedly contributed. See id. at 233.
56 None of this is to say that Gensler was necessarily wrong on all interpretations of the
facts.  If one interpreted Strabala’s claims to have designed the buildings as statements of
historical fact rather than as statements of authorship, and if, in fact, he was not involved in
the design in the way he implied, then perhaps a false advertising claim (focused on state-
ments of fact regarding his role and not statements of authorship) could have survived.  To
establish such a claim, Strabala would have had to prove, among other things, that that the
allegedly false statement had the capacity to deceive a substantial segment of potential
consumers and that the deception was likely to influence the consumers’ purchasing deci-
sion. See, e.g., Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2000).
For that distinction between false advertising and false designation of origin claims to hold,
courts would need to be diligent about distinguishing material false statements of fact from
claims of authorship that Dastar found irrelevant, lest the false advertising option swallow
the Dastar rule.  And as Gensler perhaps suggests, that distinction may turn out to be too
fine in practice, and therefore not worth the candle.
57 No. 13-10226, 2013 WL 2626853 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2013).
58 Id. at *3.
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 The court later came to grasp Dastar’s import, granting summary judgment because
the defendants were the actual manufacturers of the tangible photos about which Masck
complained.  Masck v. Sports Illustrated, 5 F. Supp. 3d. 881, 885–86 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
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As the next Section illustrates, courts have had particular difficulty apply-
ing Dastar in cases involving digital goods.  That’s not terribly surprising, of
course, since the Supreme Court clearly was focused on creative works dis-
tributed in tangible form and was not contemplating the complexities of the
digital world.62  But the challenge here is increasingly important.
B. Dastar in the Digital Era
Courts applying Dastar in the digital context have had to confront
squarely the question of what things count as “goods” in modern trademark
law, and what kinds of indications of those goods’ origin may give rise to a
Lanham Act claim.
In Cisco Technology, Inc. v. Certification Trendz, Ltd.,63 for example, Cisco
alleged that the defendants’ copying of Cisco’s copyrighted certification
exam questions and answers constituted copyright infringement and false
designation of origin in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.64
Cisco developed a series of exams for the purpose of certifying the compe-
tency of users of Cisco’s information technology products and services.  The
defendants operated several anonymously registered websites in the United
Kingdom through which they sold practice exams that purportedly prepared
people for Cisco’s certifications.65  According to Cisco, the practice exams
contained exam questions and answers that were “identical or substantially
similar to Cisco’s . . . copyrighted questions and answers.”66  Defendants
moved to dismiss the false designation of origin claim, arguing that, by
including “original materials such as explanations” in addition to Cisco’s
copyrighted questions and answers, they had created “a new product which,
under Dastar, cannot support a false designation of origin claim under the
Lanham Act.”67
Though the court acknowledged the significance of Dastar and its hold-
ing that “origin of goods” refers only to the origin of tangible goods, it
believed that the viability of the false designation of origin claim could turn
on the presence of explanations and other similar content, “which could the-
oretically create a ‘new’ product based upon the original.”68  That conclu-
sion was a reaction to the distinction the Supreme Court made between
62 See Stacey M. Lantagne, The Copymark Creep: How the Normative Standards of Fan Com-
munities Can Rescue Copyright, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 482 (2016) (“The modern world’s
goods are increasingly not tangible, which makes the Dastar decision difficult for courts to
apply.”).
63 177 F. Supp. 3d 732 (D. Conn. 2016).
64 Id. at 733.
65 Id. at 734.  Defendants delivered those practice exams electronically (via download)
and through the mail. Id.
66 Id. Some of defendants’ products also were allegedly advertised as including
“Expert Verified Answers . . . With Explanations.”  Id.
67 Id. at 737.
68 Id.
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Dastar’s unaccredited use of Fox’s content,69 which was not actionable,70 and
“mere repackaging” of physical videotapes.  As the Court made clear, had
Dastar merely bought some Crusade videos and physically repackaged them,
a false designation of origin claim would “undoubtedly [have been]
sustained.”71
According to Cisco Technology, if the defendants had added content when
creating their practice exams, the false designation of origin claim would
likely have failed, since in that case the defendants would have created a new
“good” and not simply “repackaged” the exam materials as their own.72  The
obvious implication is that reuse of the Cisco material without alteration
could be actionable because, in that court’s understanding, that would have
constituted mere repackaging.
Such an understanding of Dastar is badly mistaken, for it misses the fact
that the Court’s reference to repackaging was meant precisely to differentiate
precisely a claim based on physical packaging from one focused on the con-
tent of works.  If the Cisco Technology court were right that Dastar would not
bar a claim based on reuse of material without alteration, then Dastar would
have utterly failed in preventing use of the Lanham Act as some “mutant”
“species” of copyright,73 for claims would survive Dastar in inverse relation to
the likelihood that the conduct constituted copyright infringement.
But Cisco Technology is not the only case in which a court has struggled
with the meaning of “repackaging” in this sense.  In Do It Best Corp. v. Passport
Software, Inc., the court similarly refused to dismiss a false designation of ori-
gin claim based on the defendant’s removal of digital copyright notices from
69 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (“[Das-
tar] took a creative work in the public domain . . . copied it, made modifications (arguably
minor), and produced its very own series of videotapes.”).
70 Id. at 37.
71 Id. at 31.
72 Cisco Tech., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 737.  The court then suggested that defendants’ use
of the description “REAL Exam Questions and Answers from the ACTUAL Test” might
subject them to liability since that statement “may have implied to potential consumers
both the authorization to release such questions and the presence of such questions in the
public domain.”  Id. at 738.  According to the court, that implication would give rise to a
“traditional confusion” claim under section 43(a)(1)(A), since consumers might be con-
fused about sponsorship or affiliation.  Id. We agree with the court that a claim based on
that statement might not be barred by Dastar, but only if it was understood as the sort of
false advertising claim to which the Supreme Court explicitly left the door open. See Das-
tar, 539 U.S. at 38 (“If, moreover, the producer of a video that substantially copied the
Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the impression that
the video was quite different from that series, then one or more of the respondents might
have a cause of action—not for reverse passing off under the ‘confusion . . . as to the
origin’ provision of § 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the ‘misrepresents the
nature, characteristics [or] qualities’ provision of § 43(a)(1)(B).” (alterations in original)).
We do not believe that a claim based on an implication of public domain status can reason-
ably be conceived of as a “traditional confusion claim.”
73 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (“[T]hat representation would create a species of mutant
copyright law. . . .”).
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portions of software programs and replacement of those notices with its
own.74  According to the court, the challenged conduct could give rise to a
claim because it was possible that the replacement of copyright notices con-
stituted “mere repackaging” of the programs, even though no physical pack-
aging was involved.75
Similarly in Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., the plaintiff alleged reverse pass-
ing off when defendant Eventbrite scraped the information about hotels, res-
taurants, and bars from the plaintiff’s site rather than aggregating the
information itself.76  While admitting that it found the Supreme Court’s “tan-
gible goods” language in Dastar “confusing, and tend[ing] to suggest that
electronic products are not covered by the Lanham Act,”77 the court rejected
Eventbrite’s motion to dismiss.  According to the court, the Supreme Court
“used that language [about tangible goods] simply to distinguish goods and
products offered for sale (which receive Lanham Act protection) from any
‘idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods’ (which are pro-
tected only by copyright laws).”78  Since Cvent did “not assert that Eventbrite
ha[d] passed off its ideas as its own, but rather that Eventbrite ha[d] re-
branded and re-packaged its product (the CSN venue database),” the court
denied Eventbrite’s motion to dismiss.79  Of course, Cvent’s product was
content.
In all of these cases, courts have failed to internalize the fact that the
Supreme Court’s reference to repackaging was meant to distinguish physical
goods from intangible content.  Dastar didn’t simply copy Fox’s ideas when it
made its video series—it copied the content of Fox’s television series, meta-
phorically “repackaging” it as Dastar’s own—which was every bit as much a
“repackaging” as Eventbrite’s use of Cvent’s data.  But that was not the sense
in which the Supreme Court used “repackaging.”  It’s not that the Court did
not appreciate that intangibles are sometimes the relevant economic unit; it
simply rejected the idea that the Lanham Act permitted courts to define
“goods” in those economic terms.  “Goods,” for Lanham Act purposes, are
physical things.  Repackaging is a physicalist concept.
Even aside from the question of repackaging, courts in several false des-
ignation of origin cases have fallen for the “economic unit” reasoning and
accepted that intangible content was a relevant good.  In Bob Creeden & Asso-
ciates v. Infosoft, Inc., for example, the plaintiff alleged that Infosoft’s attempts
to sell Creeden’s computerized ordering systems to a competitor and its
development of a retail order capture system “based entirely or largely on
74 Do It Best Corp. v. Passport Software, Inc., No. 01 C 7674, 2004 WL 1660814 (N.D.
Ill. July 23, 2004).
75 Id. at *16–18.
76 Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927 (E.D. Va. 2010).
77 Id. at 936.
78 Id. (quoting Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37).
79 Id.
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Creeden’s software” constituted reverse passing off.80  The court determined
that the “tangible good” at issue was the software system that Infosoft pur-
portedly derived from Creeden’s system, and that, under Dastar, Infosoft was
the origin of that system, even if it was based on Creeden’s underlying work.
As a result, Infosoft’s designation of the system as its own did not constitute
reverse passing off.  That was, in our view, the right result, but it depended
on the incorrect conclusion that an intangible software product can be a
relevant tangible good.
In Fortres Grand v. Warner Bros., the developer of a desktop management
program called “Clean Slate” sued Warner Brothers for using the words
“clean slate” to describe a fictional hacking program in The Dark Knight
Rises.81  According to Fortres Grand, sales of its Clean Slate software dropped
significantly after the release of the movie, which it claimed was “due to
potential customers mistakenly believing that its Clean Slate software [was]
illicit or phony on account of Warner Bros.’ use of the name ‘the clean slate’
in The Dark Knight Rises.”82  By the time the case reached the Seventh Circuit,
Fortres Grand pressed its claim only in reverse confusion terms.  Thus,
according to the court,
Fortres Grand must plausibly [have] allege[d] that Warner Bros.’ use of the
words ‘clean slate’ in its movie to describe an elusive hacking program that
can eliminate information from any and every database on earth ha[d]
caused a likelihood that consumers w[ould] be confused into thinking that
Fortres Grand’s Clean Slate software ‘emanate[d] from, [was] connected to,
or [was] sponsored by [Warner Bros.].83
As the Seventh Circuit recognized, Fortres Grand was an unusual case
because it involved the question of confusion between a senior user’s product
and a fictional product in a junior user’s creative work.84  The court under-
stood Dastar to require a comparison “between the senior user’s product”
(here, the Clean Slate software) “and the junior user’s creative work,” and
“not any fictional product therein.”85  The court then proceeded to charac-
terize the movie and the software as “tangible product[s]” for purposes of
comparison.86
In fact, in forward confusion cases where the allegedly infringing use is in a
junior user’s movie, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “goods” in § 1125
likely compels lower courts to look to the movie, since it is the junior user’s
only tangible product in the marketplace about which consumers could be
confused.  In reverse confusion based on a junior user’s movie, however, it is
not so cut-and-dried.  Because the confusion is about the origin, sponsor-
80 Bob Creeden & Assocs. v. Infosoft, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 876, 877–78 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
81 Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 763 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2014).
82 Id. at 700.
83 Id. at 701–02 (last alteration in original).
84 Id. at 702.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 702–03.
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ship, or approval of the senior user’s product, which is tangible, there is no
clear command that we compare that product (the software) to Warner
Bros.’ tangible product (its movie) when considering the factor.  Regardless,
because the infringing act is the junior user’s use of the mark “in connection
with any goods,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125, we think the word “goods” must mean the
same thing there (tangible goods) that it means in the later clause, and so
we conclude that Warner Bros.’ movie—its tangible good—is the correct
comparator product, even while using the product-similarity factor to ana-
lyze reverse confusion.87
In a footnote, the court defended its characterization of the plaintiff’s
software as a tangible product:
We assume the Supreme Court would view a downloaded file from a
website as the tangible product sold by Fortres Grand in this context, even
though it is not literally tangible.  We think, in general, the relevant question
of source in the context of a download is which entity is responsible for the
file hosted on the server which is downloaded by the consumer.88
The question of the circumstances under which a downloadable digital
file should count as a tangible object, and the further question of whether
use in a movie could indicate the origin of that tangible object (as opposed
to indicating the origin of the intangible content of that file), is one we take
up at length below.  For our purposes here, we simply highlight the court’s
willingness to treat the movie as a tangible good, without even attempting to
identify a tangible embodiment, let alone any designation of the origin of the
tangible embodiment as such.
This was not new for the Seventh Circuit.  In Eastland Music Group, LLC
v. Lionsgate Entertainment, Inc., the court rejected Eastland Music’s claim that
Lionsgate’s use of “50/50” as the title of a film infringed its rights in the
marks “Phifty–50” and “50/50,” which Eastland used as the name of a rap
duo.89  But it did so on the ground that confusion was unlikely.  According to
the court, “[t]he title of a work of intellectual property can infringe another
author’s mark only if the title falsely implies that the latter author is its ori-
gin.”90  Thus, the only reason “[t]he titles of Truman Capote’s novella Break-
fast at Tiffany’s, and the movie of the same name, do not infringe the rights of
Tiffany & Co.” is that “no reasonable reader or moviegoer thinks that the
jeweler is the source of the book or the movie.”91  Though it acknowledged
that Dastar required a focus on confusion about the origin of tangible goods,
the court ignored the fact that use in a title indicates no such origin.  Resolv-
ing the case simply on confusion grounds, the court held that “Eastland
Music’s complaint d[id] not (and could not plausibly) allege that consumers
87 Id. (footnotes omitted).
88 Id. at 703 n.8.
89 Eastland Music Grp., LLC v. Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc., 707 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2013).
90 Id. at 872 (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23
(2003)).
91 Id.
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treat it as the producer or source of the film 50/50, or treat Lionsgate as the
producer of the 2003 rap album.”92
The Ninth Circuit has had its own difficulties evaluating digital goods.
In Harbour v. Farquhar, the plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the Lan-
ham Act “by licensing [plaintiffs’] digitalized musical compositions to various
television and film producers and falsely representing that [defendants] had
provided the musical services, composed the music, and produced the digital
goods.”93  The court ultimately rejected the claim, concluding that the
“goods” at issue “were the completed television programs, or the products
offered for sale to the public.  [Plaintiffs’] musical compositions were
‘idea[s], concept[s], or communication[s] embodied within those goods.’”94
That conclusion was odd in that the defendants weren’t selling completed
television programs, so the indication of the origin of the programs wasn’t at
issue in the case.  The claims related to defendants’ designation of the origin
of the musical compositions offered to third parties for use in television pro-
grams and films.  The compositions may not have been tangible goods, and
the indication of their “origin” may have referred only to the origin of the
creative content, but it was those compositions that should have been the
court’s focus.  Compounding that erroneous focus, the court entirely missed
the significance of Dastar, making no effort to evaluate whether completed
television shows were in any meaningful sense “tangible” simply because they
were offered to the public.
Perhaps the best illustrations of the challenges of digital goods are the
hundreds of cases filed by Slep–Tone Entertainment95 (now Phoenix
92 Id. In most circuits, these kinds of cases would be resolved under Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), which held that use of a mark in the title of an expressive work
(like a movie) is insulated from liability unless it has “no artistic relevance” to the underly-
ing work or it “explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.”  Id. at 999;
see also, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying
Rogers and rejecting Jim Brown’s Lanham Act claim against video game that included his
likeness); Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir.
2012) (alleging a violation based on the depiction of university football team logos and
uniforms in oil paintings); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095,
1097 (9th Cir. 2008) (claiming a violation based on imitation of logo and building de´cor in
video game).  Despite the Rogers test’s concern with the First Amendment implications of
allowing claims against uses of marks in expressive works, the Seventh Circuit steadfastly
refuses to engage Rogers because of that case’s constitutional footing. See Eastland Music
Grp., 707 F.3d at 871 (“Nor need we decide whether to follow Rogers v. Grimaldi . . . . Rogers
treated that doctrine as an application of the first amendment rather than the Lanham
Act, and courts should avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication.”).  For an argument
against treating expressive use cases as ordinary likelihood of confusion cases, see William
McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253
(2013).
93 Harbour v. Farquhar, 245 F. App’x 582, 582–83 (9th Cir. 2007) (mem.).
94 Id. at 583 (alterations in original) (quoting Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37).
95 Full disclosure: one of us (McKenna) was the lead author on amicus briefs in two
cases involving Slep–Tone, both of which argued against Slep–Tone’s position.  Brief of
Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of Appellees, Phx. Entm’t
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Entertainment) and other purported owners of karaoke tracks.96  Slep–Tone
produces audiovisual karaoke tracks under its Sound Choice mark.97  These
tracks set music to an audiovisual display that scrolls through the lyrics of the
song and other background visual content.98  Slep–Tone’s tracks display the
Sound Choice trademark at the beginning and end of each track, and
Slep–Tone sued various bars and restaurants that it alleged were using coun-
terfeit Sound Choice karaoke tracks.  In some cases, Slep–Tone alleged that
the bars and restaurants had illegally downloaded the tracks or copied them
from authorized physical copies (DVDs) owned by third parties.99  In other
cases, Slep–Tone complained that the bars and restaurants had violated
Slep–Tone’s space-shifting policies by making additional, unauthorized cop-
ies of tracks from legitimately purchased DVDs and transferring them to play-
back machines.100
These kinds of allegations, if true, obviously make for straightforward
cases of copyright infringement (setting aside any sort of fair use argument
regarding space-shifting).  But prior to its recent loss in the Seventh Cir-
cuit,101 Slep–Tone had never alleged copyright infringement in any of its
complaints.  It had instead only asserted trademark infringement claims,
alleging that the use of the Sound Choice mark within the unauthorized
karaoke tracks falsely represented the origin of the tracks, and that reproduc-
tion of the visual layout of the tracks infringed their trade dress in the
layout.102
Partners, LLC v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2844), https://
tushnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/basket-case-amicus-brief-nov-30-final.pdf; Brief of
Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of Appellees Canton Phoe-
nix, Inc. & Bing Pan Zhu, Slep–Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Canton Phoenix Inc., No. 14-36018
(9th Cir. 2015), https://tushnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/slep-tone-amicus-final-as-
filed.pdf.
96 See Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1143–44, 1146 (9th Cir.
2008) (relying on Dastar to dismiss Lanham Act claim where the plaintiff, which did not
have standing to sue for copyright infringement, alleged that the defendant was misrepre-
senting the licensing status of karaoke tracks, and that such status was “part of the nature,
characteristics, or qualities of the karaoke products,” and holding that “the nature, charac-
teristics, and qualities of karaoke recordings under the Lanham Act are more properly
construed to mean characteristics of the good itself, such as the original song and artist of
the karaoke recording, and the quality of its audio and visual effects”).
97 Rumsey, 829 F.3d at 819.
98 Id. at 820.
99 See, e.g., Slep–Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Sellis Enters., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 897 (N.D. Ill.
2015) (asserting false designation of origin claim against bar owner that contracted with
karaoke operators that used unauthorized duplicate tracks in which the Sound Choice
mark was displayed).
100 See, e.g., Rumsey, 829 F.3d at 821.
101 Id. at 831.
102 See, e.g., Sellis, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 897; Slep–Tone Entm’t Corp v. Canton Phoenix
Inc., No. 3:14-cv-00764, 2014 WL 5817903 (D. Or. Nov. 7, 2014); Slep–Tone Entm’t Corp.
v. Duffy’s Irish Pub, No. 6:13-cv-560, 2013 WL 5774128 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2013).  It has never
been entirely clear why Slep–Tone has not asserted copyright claims, but Slep–Tone did
admit in some cases that it does not own the copyrights in the tracks. Rumsey, 829 F.3d at
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In early versions of these cases, Slep–Tone straightforwardly based its
claims on allegations of confusion regarding authorship of the tracks.  Specif-
ically, Slep–Tone claimed that consumers would wrongly believe that
Slep–Tone was the author of the content of the tracks, which it says it was not
because the defendants’ copies were unauthorized.103  Those claims are
quite plainly barred by Dastar, as they flatly allege confusion regarding the
origin of intangible creative content.104  Put simply, even if Slep–Tone were
right that consumers are likely to be confused about who created the content
of the karaoke tracks (and query whether they would be, since of course
these were reproductions of the Sound Choice tracks and therefore consisted
of the same content), that kind of confusion is irrelevant for Lanham Act
purposes.
Nevertheless, district courts were sometimes persuaded by Slep–Tone’s
claims because they could identify the copies of the karaoke tracks as new
“goods.”  In Slep–Tone v. Sellis, for example, the court held that Slep–Tone’s
claims were not barred by Dastar because “[t]he media and format shifting
operate[d] as an independent creation event, placing a new ‘good’ in the
marketplace.”105  According to the court, taking a Slep–Tone CD and copy-
ing the tracks onto another CD would create a new good, and one that
Slep–Tone did not create.106
The same was true in Dastar: just as making an exact copy of Fox’s Crusade
series would have made Dastar the originator of a new tangible product sold
in the marketplace, the media-shifter making an exact copy of Slep–Tone’s
tracks is the originator of a new tangible product in the market place.107
As a result, the court held, even if the media-shifted tracks were identical
to the original tracks, “[b]ecause the producer of the new good (karaoke
jockeys) and the markholder of the mark on the goods (Slep–Tone) [did]
824 (“We are told [Slep–Tone] does not [own the copyright].”).  Since these tracks quite
obviously are derivative works, however, their creators would ordinarily own the copyrights
to the extent they have made lawful use of the underlying works.  That raises the possibility
that Slep–Tone has made unauthorized use of the underlying musical works, as has been
implied in some of the cases.
103 See, e.g., Slep–Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Karaoke Kandy Store, Inc., No. 1:10CV 00990,
2011 WL 5105803, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2011) (“Slep–Tone argues that [display of its
mark in the karaoke performance] falsely leads the participants . . . to believe that the
recordings are being used with the authorization of Slep–Tone.”), rev’d, 517 F. App’x 339
(6th Cir. 2013); Brief of Appellant at 20, Slep–Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Canton Phx. Inc., No.
14-36018 (9th Cir. 2015) (complaining about “defendants’ presentation of counterfeit
copyrightable content, with trademarks that attribute such [content] to Slep–Tone”); id. at
20–21 (“Canton also included Slep–Tone’s registered marks and presented those marks in
association with the ‘intangible expression.’”).
104 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
105 Sellis, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 905.
106 Id.
107 Id. (citation omitted) (citing Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36).
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not match, the alleged use of SlepTone’s mark on the copied tracks [was] a
false designation of origin covered by the Lanham Act.”108
Of course, since Dastar itself involved new goods (Dastar’s new video-
tapes), one would think recognition of a new good would be the beginning
of the analysis, not its conclusion.  Even if the media-shifted tracks consti-
tuted new goods, the important issue is whether consumers are likely to be
confused about the origin of those tracks as such.  But the Sellis court did not
engage that question, instead simply treating the use of the Sound Choice
mark within the content of the tracks as a false designation of the origin of
the digital track.
Even when courts have rejected Slep–Tone’s claims, they often have mis-
understood the relevant goods at issue.  In Slep–Tone v. Canton Phoenix,109 for
example, the court rejected Slep–Tone’s claim on the ground that Canton
did not create a new good when it transferred the karaoke tracks.  According
to the court, the relevant “goods” were the karaoke tracks themselves, and
Slep–Tone had not alleged that the transfer somehow affected the quality of
the audio recording or visual display.110  The court then contemplated two
ways in which Slep–Tone might have had a legitimate claim.  First,
[i]f transferring the karaoke tracks to the hard drive degraded their quality
in some way, the tracks would no longer [have been] in their original and
unadulterated forms as produced by Slep–Tone, and yet they still would
have carried Slep–Tones [sic] registered mark as if they were original goods.
This type of confusion as to the quality of the goods normally produced and
sold by Slep–Tone would be an actionable trademark claim.111
And second, “if Canton had recorded or obtained additional karaoke
tracks and added them to its hard drive and affixed the Sound Choice mark
to them, that too would have created an actionable trademark violation.”112
The court did not consider with respect to either of those claims, how-
ever, how the identified conduct would have caused material confusion
about the origin of any tangible goods.  Even if Canton’s transferral of the
files to its hard drive degraded their quality, the only indication of the origin
of the digital files still would have been the Sound Choice mark within the
content of the karaoke track.  It is entirely unclear why that use would indi-
cate anything to consumers about the origin of the file as such, or why, even
if it did, that internal use should be relevant.  Nor is it clear why adding
additional karaoke tracks would change anything about indication of the ori-
gin of the tangible file.
Over time, Slep–Tone developed a more sophisticated version of the
argument the Sellis court accepted.  Particularly in cases involving copies of
the karaoke tracks on users’ hard drives, rather than copies shifted onto new
108 Id.
109 Slep–Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Canton Phx. Inc., No. 3:14-cv-00764, 2014 WL 5817903
(D. Or. Nov. 7, 2014).
110 Id. at *2.
111 Id.
112 Id. at *3.
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CDs, Slep–Tone argued that the digital files in which the bars and restaurants
reproduced the karaoke tracks were tangible goods, and the unauthorized
reproduction of Slep–Tone’s Sound Choice mark within those tracks would
cause confusion.  As the Seventh Circuit summarized the claim in its recent
Phoenix Entertainment Partners, LLC v.  Rumsey decision:
Slep–Tone’s theory of the case proceeds as follows.  When a person,
without authorization from Slep–Tone, copies a Sound Choice karaoke
track onto a different medium (a computer hard drive, for example) from
the original CD+G or MP3+G medium distributed by Slep–Tone, that person
creates a new good that is distinct from Slep–Tone’s product.  But the copy,
when played, will still display both the registered Sound Choice marks along
with each of the other elements of the trade dress we have described.  Thus,
when an unauthorized copy is played at The Basket Case, patrons of the pub
will think that the copy is a genuine Sound Choice track that was manufac-
tured by Slep–Tone and purchased by or otherwise licensed to the defend-
ants.  In fact, however, it is not a Sound Choice product, but rather is being
passed off as such by the defendants.113
That argument has a sort of “one from column A and one from column
B” character.  There is some confusion (column A), and there are tangible
objects (column B), therefore a claim under the Lanham Act is appropri-
ate.114  The difficulty, of course, is the lack of connection between any such
confusion and the tangibility of the files.  Slep–Tone did not seriously allege
that consumers were confused about the origin of the digital files as such.
And for good reason—the bars and restaurants in those cases were not sell-
ing or otherwise distributing the digital files but were instead simply allowing
customers to play the files back from the machines in the bars.  Indeed, the
users likely had no idea whether the tracks were playing from a DVD or a
digital file, or streaming from YouTube.
This is an issue that the Supreme Court didn’t have to confront in Das-
tar, since the Court clearly was imagining a world in which creative works
were distributed in tangible form.  But it’s worth noting that, in fact, Dastar
produced tangible goods (the videotapes), and the Court accepted that the
external labeling of those physical videotapes was the only indication of ori-
gin that mattered.115  In other words, the Court didn’t even contemplate
inferring anything about the origin of the tangible goods from the intangible
content of those goods.
We think that reveals something important about the scope of Dastar,
namely that tangibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition.  Not all uses
in relation to tangible goods survive Dastar; courts need to focus on whether
the alleged confusion relates specifically to the origin of the goods as physical
objects.  In other words, courts will need to determine whether the “tangible”
113 Phx. Entm’t Partners, LLC v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817, 823 (7th Cir. 2016).
114 We thank Rebecca Tushnet for suggesting this characterization.
115 See supra Section I.A.
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objects are material to consumers.116  This is true even though much expres-
sive material is conveyed in physical form, and so strategic plaintiffs might
often claim that their case is about the source of irrelevant physical goods.
The requirement that the tangibility of the digital file be material to
consumers is important, as a number of the cases that have struggled with
Dastar have gone astray precisely because they have treated the existence of a
new digital file in a highly formalistic way, without considering whether any
potential confusion would relate to the origin of those goods.117  Cases like
Sellis, for example, miss the mark because they fixate on the existence of a
physical good without making an effort to determine how the origin of that
good was indicated or whether consumers would ever interact with the physi-
cal good.  The Seventh Circuit clearly understood this when it decided Phoe-
nix Entertainment Partners, LLC v. Rumsey:
A consumer of karaoke services like a patron of The Basket Case never
sees a disc that is wrapped in Slep–Tone or Sound Choice packaging.  He
never sees a website offering downloads of Sound Choice tracks.  As we have
said, the defendants’ patrons are not direct purchasers of karaoke tracks.
They simply see and hear the karaoke tracks that The Basket Case plays for
them.  They have no interaction with the medium from which the tracks are
played, in the way that a karaoke jockey might.  Any confusion, in short, is
not about the source of the tangible good sold in the marketplace, as Dastar
requires.118
And that understanding is spreading.  In its more recent decision in
Slep–Tone Entertainment Corp. v. Wired for Sound Karaoke & DJ Services, LLC,119
the Ninth Circuit similarly rejected Slep–Tone’s argument that consumers
would be confused about the origin of the digital files because of their
content:
We agree with the Seventh Circuit, which held, in addressing a similar claim
by this very Plaintiff against another karaoke operator, that “the ‘good’
116 For arguments in favor of materiality playing a more important role generally in
trademark law, see Lemley & McKenna, supra note 32; Rebecca Tushnet, Running the
Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305
(2011).
117 Formalism as to tangible computer memory could extend even further.  That is, the
files qua files are not tangible; they are information.  The information is stored on a tangi-
ble object (CD, memory stick, or other computer memory).  Taking the formalistic
approach to its extreme would result in asking about the source of the storage medium—
the company that produced, or at least stands behind, the (blank) thumb drive, hard drive,
or CD, which in most of the cases we are discussing is irrelevant. Cf. Capitol Records, LLC
v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that “phonorecords” under
the Copyright Act referred only to a physical medium on which a file is stored, and that the
only way a lawfully purchased iTunes file could be lawfully transferred to another is by
physically transferring the consumer’s hard disk).  In most Internet file “transfers,” the
medium is not transferred; rather, a copy of the information contained in the file is trans-
ferred to the recipient’s storage medium.
118 Rumsey, 829 F.3d at 829.
119 845 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
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whose ‘origin’ is material for purposes of a trademark infringement claim is
the ‘tangible product sold in the marketplace’ rather than the creative con-
tent of that product.”  Karaoke patrons who see Defendants’ performances
of Plaintiff’s karaoke tracks will not be confused about “the source of the
tangible good sold in the marketplace.” Consumers are not aware of the new,
media-shifted digital files about which Plaintiff asserts confusion.120
Importantly, even in cases in which digital files might count as relevant
goods, Dastar precludes arguments that the origin of copies of creative works
can be inferred from their intangible content.  Recall here that Dastar cre-
ated physical copies of its videos.121  The Court nevertheless implicitly
refused to infer from the creative content anything about the origin of those
physical copies when it concluded that Dastar had correctly identified the
origin of its videos by marking the physical copies with its own name. Dastar
thus precludes arguments that confusion about the origin of tangible copies
of works will be caused by the content of the works fixed in those files.122  To
be cognizable, a claim must assert likely confusion attributable to a designa-
tion external to the file itself.123
If it were otherwise, creative plaintiffs could always avoid Dastar simply by
embedding their marks within a creative work.  Disney could prevent others
from selling copies of Steamboat Willie even after its copyright expired by argu-
ing that, because Mickey Mouse is in the movie and is Disney’s trademark,
consumers will be confused about the source of physical copies of the movie.
Absent a rule prohibiting arguments based on the content of a work, that
claim would survive Dastar because it is nominally focused on the source of
physical goods, even though in reality it amounts to an assertion that con-
sumers will think Disney authorized the reproduction of the content.  This
would create precisely the sort of “mutant copyright law” the Supreme Court
rejected.124  As the Seventh Circuit said, rejecting Slep–Tone’s argument
120 Id. at 1250 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Rumsey, 829 F.3d at 828,
829).
121 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 27 (2003).
122 The Wired for Sound court came close to grasping this point when it stated that
“Defendants make allegedly unauthorized use of the content of Plaintiff’s karaoke tracks,
which Dastar precludes as a trademark claim.” Wired for Sound, 845 F.3d at 1250.  The court
implied, however, that its holding might be limited to situations in which the defendant is
not selling the digital file. See id.  We agree that the case for applying Dastar is clearest
when the defendant does not sell the files, but we believe Dastar’s rule is more general.
Indeed, Dastar itself involved the sale of a good containing the plaintiff’s content.
123 Several recent decisions have understood that, if the plaintiff’s only claim of confu-
sion comes from the reproduction of the expressive content of a work, then Dastar ought
to apply, because origin cannot be inferred from the content alone. See, e.g., Pulse Entm’t
Corp. v. David, No. CV 14-4732 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that Dastar barred false
designation of origin claim based on explicit misattribution of hologram to wrong creator;
hologram was creative work like a cartoon); Masck v. Sports Illustrated, 5 F. Supp. 3d 881
(E.D. Mich. 2014) (holding that Dastar barred a false designation of origin claim based on
copying of photos).
124 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34.
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that confusion would result from playback of karaoke tracks in which their
marks were embedded:
That the Sound Choice mark is embedded in the creative content of the
karaoke track and is visible to the public whenever the track is played does
not falsely suggest that Slep–Tone is endorsing the performance, as the
plaintiffs have alleged.  The producers of communicative goods often embed
their marks not only on the packaging of the good but in its content. . . . [A]
movie theater may freely exhibit a copy of Universal Studios’ 1925 silent
film, The Phantom of the Opera, which is now in the public domain, without
fear of committing trademark infringement simply because Universal’s regis-
tered trademark will be displayed when the film is played.125
We think consumers will rarely be materially confused about the origin
of a digital file, but we recognize that such confusion is possible in some
circumstances.  Indeed, we can imagine situations in which the origin of a
particular copy would be important to consumers.  Take, for example, a web-
site through which users can download Microsoft Word.  Undoubtedly con-
sumers value the content of the Microsoft Word executable file, and the
Microsoft trademark gives them information about the origin of that content.
But it also seems quite likely to us that consumers would care about the ori-
gin of the particular downloadable file, precisely because they would want
assurance that their downloaded software would work properly.  Thus, use of
a mark to designate the origin of executable files might well meet our stan-
dard.  That use would, however, have to be “external” to the file—meaning it
would not be enough that Microsoft trademarks are embedded within the
downloadable software file.
C. The Future of Dastar in the Digital Era
The focus on tangibility and materiality has important implications for
digital uses that will proliferate with the distribution of digital files involved
in 3D printing and other technologies.
Tangibility dictates that the proper inquiry must be whether consumers
are likely to be confused about the source of some tangible good sold by the
defendant, not the good depicted within the creative content.  Consumers
who download a digital file that allows them to print their own Louis Vuitton
handbags would need to be confused not about the origin of the design of
the handbags, but about the origin of the digital file itself.  And any confusion
about the source of the digital file would have to be traceable to something
other than the content of that file—confusion regarding the source of a digi-
tal file containing a digital model of a Louis Vuitton handbag cannot be
caused by the appearance of Louis Vuitton marks within the digital model.
Consider the usage complained of in the BMW v. TurboSquid case:
TurboSquid used a computer program to create a digital model of a BMW
car, which included, in digital form, the same marks as would appear on a
125 Phx. Entm’t Partners, LLC v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing
Slep–Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Sellis Enters., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 897 (N.D. Ill. 2015)).
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“real” BMW car.  Although TurboSquid removed its files depicting BMW
models in response to the litigation, a similar file of a model of a Tesla car is
depicted below:126
FIGURE 4
On our reading, Dastar requires courts to confront uses like this by asking
what consumers who encounter the Tesla marks on TurboSquid’s website
believe those marks signify.  Do they signify the origin of the content of the
digital file—that is, the design of a Tesla car—or the origin of the digital file
itself?  We think it is very unlikely that consumers would regard the use of the
Tesla marks within the content of the file as indications of the origin of the
digital file, even if they suggest the origin of the content or idea embodied in
the computer model.  The file contains a rendering of a Tesla car—a real
product that can be found in the physical world and cannot be realistically
represented without the use of Tesla’s trademarks.
But this is not ultimately an empirical question, for even if consumers
were likely to think that usage within the content indicated something about
the origin of the file itself, any resulting confusion would be irrelevant under
Dastar.127  Only indicia external to the file should be considered in evaluat-
ing potential confusion.  That’s important, because visitors to the TurboS-
quid website encounter a number of external indications of the origin of the
files on the site.  Most obviously, the website prominently displays the
TurboSquid mark.  Visitors who spend more than a moment on the website
also quickly learn that the site hosts thousands of files depicting a wide variety
126 2014 Tesla Model S, TURBOSQUID, http://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/3d-2016-
tesla-s-interior-model/935093 (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
127 For this reason, it would not matter whether the digital image in the TurboSquid
listing above included a different company’s trademark or even whether the image
depicted a Tesla logo on a vehicle the design of which was a product of the creator’s
imagination (rather than realistically representing a vehicle designed and sold by Tesla).
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of branded goods, and that the site touts TurboSquid’s and its contributors’
ability to create quality digital models.  That context makes clear that
TurboSquid (or its community of contributors) is the origin (creator) of the
files on the site.128
A visitor who clicks on the particular image of the Tesla also sees (near
the top right in the image above) a description of the model and the name of
the party that created the model.  Of all the indicia that identify the creator
of the file, the words “by HKV Studios” are the clearest.129  Coupled with the
creator’s name are the words “2014 Tesla Model S.”  Although that use of the
Tesla name is external to the digital model, it is a clear example of nomina-
tive fair use.130  The only simple way to direct a visitor to a model of a 2014
Tesla Model S car is to label it as such.131
Finally, the TurboSquid site includes a clear disclaimer (the text on the
right below the creator’s name; there is a second disclaimer if one scrolls
down the webpage).  Given our analysis above, we do not believe a disclaimer
is needed.  Nevertheless, a disclaimer can further dispel any potential confu-
sion, particularly in the context of a nominative use.132
128 Some websites, like peer-to-peer networks such as thepiratebay.org, tout their ability
to flaunt intellectual property law and would even further indicate that files found therein
are not created or endorsed by a brand owner.
129 If one scrolls down the screen on TurboSquid’s website, there is a prominent sec-
tion denoting the “artist” that reads something like “HKV Studios; TurboSquid Member
Since October 2005; Currently sells 277 products.” See supra note 126.
130 Nominative fair use refers to a party’s use of another’s trademark in a manner that
is necessary to describe the party’s own product or service. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Tabaris are using the term
Lexus to describe their business of brokering Lexus automobiles; when they say Lexus,
they mean Lexus.  We’ve long held that such use of the trademark is a fair use, namely
nominative fair use.  And fair use is, by definition, not infringement.”).
131 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.
1992).
With many well-known trademarks, such as Jell–O, Scotch tape and Kleenex,
there are equally informative non-trademark words describing the products (gela-
tin, cellophane tape and facial tissue).  But sometimes there is no descriptive sub-
stitute, and a problem closely related to genericity and descriptiveness is
presented when many goods and services are effectively identifiable only by their
trademarks.  For example, one might refer to “the two-time world champions” or
“the professional basketball team from Chicago,” but it’s far simpler (and more
likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago Bulls.  In such cases, use of the
trademark does not imply sponsorship or endorsement of the product because
the mark is used only to describe the thing, rather than to identify its source.
Id.
132 See Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1177 (noting that the inclusion of words like “independent”
“will usually negate any hint of sponsorship or endorsement”); see also Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 351–52 (9th Cir. 1969) (emphasizing the
defendant’s “prominent use of the word ‘Independent’ whenever the terms ‘Volkswagen’
or ‘VW’ appeared in his advertising” of his “Modern Volkswagen Porsche Service” auto
repair business, which specialized in repairs of VW and Porsche vehicles).
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With many other digital files, the context will likewise make clear that
the files—be they software programs, 3D printable CAD files, or others—
originate from someone other than the owner of the trademarks appearing
within the file.133  What makes the case of 3D printable files more challeng-
ing is that those files can be used to print physical goods.  Obviously a
nonconfused transferee of such a file who merely prints the trademarked
item for personal use is not infringing, since she has not used the mark in
commerce.134  But the possibility that the 3D printable file might be used to
create a tangible good raises the prospect of a post-sale confusion claim
based on the theory that, even if the consumers of the digital files would not
be confused about the origin of the 3D printed bags, third parties who
viewed those bags in use would be confused.135
The post-sale confusion doctrine is controversial, not least because
claims of post-sale confusion often really do not depend on confusion at
133 Discussion of consumer expectations regarding digital content calls to mind the
Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision, where the Court suggested that consumers generally
did not expect product design features to indicate source. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000).
134 See Cognotec Servs. Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 862 F. Supp. 45, 51
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Cognotec has failed to allege that any of the infringing materials were
disseminated ‘in commerce.’  Indeed, the amended complaint makes clear that Morgan
developed a program to use internally for its currency customers.  In other words, Mor-
gan’s program is not disseminated ‘in commerce’ as is required by a § 43(a) claim.” (cita-
tion omitted) (citing Licata & Co. v. Goldberg, 812 F. Supp. 403, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1993));
Obolensky v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 628 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 795 F.2d
1005 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that, even assuming defendant publisher’s book catalogs
falsely indicated that plaintiff’s book had been published by defendant, there could be no
liability under section 43(a) where defendant did not publish or ship the book because the
goods did not enter into commerce); Osborn, supra note 15, at 583 n.190.  Even if such
private use could be considered use in commerce, it’s difficult to imagine it would be in
interstate commerce. See Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F.3d 573, 588 (5th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 592 (2015) (mem.) (holding there can be no false designation
of origin claim where plaintiff’s actions (submitting allegedly misleading architectural
plans to city) were entirely local and thus did not meet the requirement “that the allegedly
false designation enter into and/or have an effect on interstate commerce” (citing King v.
Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 373–74 (5th Cir. 1999))).
135 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137,
152–53 (2010).  Some courts have claimed that Congress intended to endorse post-sale
confusion when it amended the Lanham Act in 1962 to remove reference to deceiving
“purchasers,” thus prohibiting any use “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.”  Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 Stat. 769, 773 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2012)); see, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs.,
Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d Cir. 2001); Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244–45
(6th Cir. 1991).  But we think that interpretation is clearly wrong, as the purpose of the
1962 Amendment was simply to ensure that the statute “relates to potential purchasers as
well as to actual purchasers.” H.R. REP. NO. 87-1108, at 4 (1961); see also Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 469–75 (1999); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark
Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 798.
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all.136  The Supreme Court has never endorsed the doctrine, and it has many
detractors.137  But whatever the merits of post-sale confusion with respect to
sales of physical goods, it has limited, if any, application in the context of
digital files.  For one thing, purchasers of TurboSquid’s digital model of the
BMW car will likely use that file in a video game or other audiovisual work.
That ultimate use is very unlikely to be deemed infringing, either because the
claim is barred under Dastar (since confusion would be based on the content
of an expressive work), or because it is insulated from liability under Rogers v.
Grimaldi.138
But even in the context of 3D printed goods like handbags, we think
post-sale confusion is inapplicable.  First, the post-sale confusion cases uni-
formly involve an initial sale of tangible goods.  The focus in these cases is on
downstream viewers of those tangible goods rather than their initial purchas-
ers, but the alleged confusion, insofar as it exists, relates to the origin of that
same tangible good originally sold by the party accused of infringement.
Things are different with respect to digital files, since the creator or dissemi-
nator of the file does not sell the good that ultimately causes the confusion;
in most cases the downstream product is not the file purchased from TurboS-
quid, but a copy of that file.  In TurboSquid’s case, any potential (though
unlikely) confusion would result from third-party use of the (copied) con-
tent, and not from consumer interaction with the digital file sold by TurboS-
quid.  TurboSquid’s use should therefore not be actionable on post-sale
confusion grounds, or post-sale confusion would simply become a backdoor
means of circumventing Dastar.
To see why this is so, suppose we buy a knock-off handbag at a flea mar-
ket, or we find instructions for how to make a knock-off handbag.  If we use
that bag or those instructions as the basis to make ten more identical hand-
bags and then sell those copies, the flea market operator cannot be liable as a
direct infringer for the ten handbags we create.  At most, the trademark
owner would have a claim against the flea market operator for indirect
infringement, which is applicable in trademark law when a party “intention-
ally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its
product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trade-
136 See Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L.
REV. 67, 104 (2012) (“It is pretty obvious to anyone who reads these cases fairly that they
are not really motivated by concern about the impact of confusion on observers of the
defendant’s goods.  They are instead clearly intended to preserve for the mark owner the
prestige value of the mark irrespective of confusion.” (footnote omitted)); see also Jeremy
N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 783 (2012) (suggesting that, in post-sale
confusion cases, the “chain of events culminating in a trademark injury appears to be
assumed sub silentio”).
137 See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 136, at 776 (proposing that the “post-sale confusion doc-
trine should be discarded entirely”).  Some courts have applied the doctrine with an appar-
ent lack of enthusiasm. See, e.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423
F.3d 539, 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff’s post-sale confusion argument
because the accused’s guitars were not “clearly inferior” to the plaintiff’s).
138 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
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mark infringement.”139  Similarly, in the case of 3D printed goods, the
printed item should not qualify for post-sale confusion because it is not the
same thing as the digital file purchased from sites like TurboSquid.140
The recipient of a CAD file could, of course, be directly liable for trade-
mark infringement if she printed multiple tangible copies and sold those
copies bearing their accompanying trademarks.  Likewise, a party could be
secondarily liable if it intentionally transferred or facilitated the transfer of a
CAD file knowing or having reason to know that the particular transferee
would use the file in an infringing way.141  But the ordinary distribution of
digital files should not itself subject the seller to trademark liability.  And
unlike with 3D printable files, downstream uses of digital files in audiovisual
works are themselves unlikely to be infringing creative uses.  As a result, even
secondary liability seems unlikely in those cases.142
II. CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES
As our discussion of these doctrinal challenges suggests, digitization
raises profound questions about the meaning of source indication and the
role of trademark law.  First, digitization calls into question the conventional
understanding of trademarks as providing information about the characteris-
tics of the goods with which they are used so that consumers can affix respon-
sibility for the quality of those goods.  That understanding is premised on the
assumption that the mark owner actually produces, or at least stands behind
the production of, the goods with which consumers ultimately interact.  Digi-
tization challenges that assumption because it holds the possibility of radi-
cally separating the design of products from their production.  That
separation casts substantial doubt on trademark law’s role, particularly vis-a`-
vis other forms of IP protection.
139 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). Inwood’s knowledge
requirement is particularized; general or probabilistic knowledge that some unidentified
parties are infringing is not enough. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d
Cir. 2010).
140 Other commentators have discussed 3D printing technology’s effects on post-sale
confusion, but they have not recognized the fundamental incongruity of the doctrine as
applied to digital files that have been sold and then subsequently used to make physical
goods. See, e.g., James Grace, Note, The End of Post-Sale Confusion: How Consumer 3D Printing
Will Diminish the Function of Trademarks, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 275–81 (2014) (discuss-
ing how 3D printing changes consumer perception of source and its effects on post-sale
confusion, but not discussing the fact that a 3D printing product is distinct from the digital
file).
141 On the requirement of particularity of the knowledge requirement, see Mark P.
McKenna, Probabilistic Knowledge of Third-Party Trademark Infringement, 2011 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 10.
142 An important issue is whether Inwood applies to an intermediary who merely facili-
tates other parties’ exchanges. See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107–10 (applying Inwood where the
intermediary had “more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is
being used to sell counterfeit goods” and instead had “contemporary knowledge of” (or
willful blindness to) specific acts that “are infringing or will infringe in the future”).
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Second, digitization profoundly disrupts trademark law’s traditional ori-
entation toward physical goods, putting ever more pressure on the already
unstable distinction between goods and services.  That has potentially signifi-
cant doctrinal consequences, since Dastar quite notably did not address ser-
vices.143  It also threatens broader destabilization of the boundaries of
trademark law’s domain.
A. When Are Intangibles “Goods”?
Trademark law’s deep structure is oriented toward physical goods.  That
orientation undoubtedly owes much to trademark law’s origins, and the par-
ticular problem of attributing ownership of, or responsibility for, a physical
good separated from its owner or producer.144  “Use of marks to indicate
ownership of goods was particularly important for owners whose goods
moved in transit, as those marks often allowed owners to claim goods that
were lost.  Producers relied on identifying marks, for example, to demon-
strate ownership of goods recovered at sea.”145  Marks were also critical “to
the operation of the guild system in medieval England,” as guilds “required
their members to affix distinguishing marks to their products” so that they
could identify goods as originating with a guild member “to restrict member-
ship and . . . punish members” producing sub-standard products.146
Though trademark law developed over time to focus on individual pro-
ducer goodwill rather than the collective goodwill of guilds,147 it retained a
strong sense that marks were not protected as such, but only when used to
denote the source of tangible goods sold in the marketplace.  As Francis
Upton described the traditional understanding in his classic treatise, a trade-
mark “is not the abstract right to the exclusive use of a certain name, letters,
mark, device or symbols, which can be acquired and possessed.  It is such use
143 See generally Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
144 Merchants used marks to demonstrate ownership of physical goods, much in the
way ranchers use cattle brands to identify their cattle. See FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTOR-
ICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 20–21 (1925); Sidney A. Dia-
mond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265, 273 (1975).
145 Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1839, 1849 (2007) (citing SCHECHTER, supra note 144, at 26–31); see also id. at 1849
n.25 (“Owners also carved identifying marks into the beaks of swans they were allowed to
own by royal privilege.” (citing SCHECHTER, supra note 144, at 35–37)).
146 Id. at 1850; see also SCHECHTER, supra note 144, at 38–63; Diamond, supra note 144,
at 273–77.
147 Thus, according to Francis Upton, the fundamental policy of trademark law was “to
protect the manufacturer, who by his skill and industry, has produced an article of mer-
chandise, that has found favor with the public, and which he has designated by a particular
name or mark.” FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS 22–23
(Albany, W.C. Little 1860). Someone other than the manufacturer could use the mark,
but only with permission of the manufacturer.  Id. at 23 (“It is not doubted that the
merchant, who imports and sells the article, may acquire the right, and be alike entitled to
protection—but he must acquire it by virtue of his relationship to the manufacturer, which
has vested in him an exclusive right to sell.”).
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only, in connection with, and as a designation of, the particular property to
which it is affixed.”148
A number of traditional features of trademark law followed from (or
were a reflection of) this conception of marks as attached to physical goods.
Most obvious was the centrality of affixation as a defining characteristic of a
trademark.149  The affixation requirement was not only a formal require-
ment of registration, it substantively reflected the fundamental understand-
ing of trademarks as being separate from, and applied to, the goods they
designated.  Because of the affixation requirement, trademark law long
refused to recognize service marks.150  Indeed, courts didn’t settle on the
appropriate test for evaluating service marks until decades after the Lanham
Act was passed.151
This conception of trademarks as indications of the origin of physical
goods was also ingrained in trademark law’s long refusal to accept licensing
or assignment of a mark.  Under traditional rules, a party could not assign or
license a trademark unless it also transferred the related business.152  It could
not because trademarks indicated the actual origin of manufacture of goods,
and when disassociated from that actual, historical origin, use of the mark
was essentially fraudulent.153
148 Id. at 22.
149 See Kathreiner’s Malzkaffee Fabriken Mit Beschraenkter Haftung v. Pastor Kneipp
Med. Co., 82 F. 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1897) (adopting the affixation rule within American
courts); M’Andrew v. Bassett (1864) 46 Eng. Rep. 965, 968 (Ch.) (Eng.) (holding that
marks only become protectable once they are physically attached to goods and sold in the
marketplace and not merely when they acquire a reputation or fame).  The Trademark Act
of 1881 required that trademark applications contain “a statement of the mode in which
the same is applied and affixed to goods.”  Trademark Act of 1881, ch. 138, § 1, 21 Stat.
502, 503, superseded by Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 724, 724 (1905), repealed by Lanham Act,
Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 427, 444 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).  The 1905 Act contained an identical provision. See Trademark Act of 1905, ch.
592, 33 Stat. 724, 724, repealed by Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 427, 444
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
150 Uncertainty about protection for services persisted into the Lanham Act era. See
Walter J. Derenberg, The Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946: Practical Effects and Experiences After
One Year’s Administration, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 831, 841–45 (1948) (noting that, of the
approximately 1300 service mark applications submitted by mid-1948, only ten were actu-
ally granted registration).
151 See In re Universal Oil Prods. Co., 476 F.2d 653, 655 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (rejecting the
argument that service mark registration was “set up ‘not for services alone, but for intangi-
ble things’” and requiring evidence of “direct association” between the claimed service
mark and the offering of services for others).
152 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1995);
1 HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 122–23 (4th ed.
1947).
153 See, e.g., Chadwick v. Covell, 23 N.E. 1068, 1068–69 (Mass. 1890) (refusing plaintiff’s
attempt to enjoin a defendant from using the same name on the ground that, although
plaintiff purportedly received a gift of one of Dr. Spencer’s recipes and trademarks for
medicines, she made the medicine with her own ingredients, tools, plant, and contrivances
and did not succeed to Dr. Spencer’s manufactory or plant).
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This is not to say that trademark law has never accommodated a broader
view—few of the rules we’ve discussed were absolute,154 and modern law has
assimilated service marks and developed a much more liberal view of assign-
ment and licensing.  And one can understand why.  Consumers sometimes
get valuable information from designations of intangibles, and in those situa-
tions, use of the same mark by multiple parties threatens genuine trademark
harm to the mark owner.  But the general focus on indications of physical
goods sensibly distinguishes trademarks from the subject matter of copyright,
which is the conceptual mirror image: copyright attaches to the intangible
work of authorship, not to the tangible copy in which it is fixed.155  Indeed,
copyright’s distinction between the intangible work and the tangible object is
the basis for the first sale doctrine, which allows the owners of tangible copies
of works to sell or otherwise dispose of those copies without infringing the
copyright.156
These conceptual boundaries are blurred when trademark law extends
to designations of the intangible, just as the boundaries between trademark
and utility and design patent are blurred when trademark reaches product
design.  And of course, trademark law has long struggled with the question of
whether the design of a product itself can serve as a trademark.157  For many
years courts refused to recognize product design in part because a trademark
was, by definition, something separate from the goods.  As the court said in
Davis v. Davis, “A trade-mark is some arbitrary or representative device
attached to or sold with merchandise and serving to designate the origin or
manufacture of that merchandise.  I do not think that the merchandise itself,
or any method of arranging the various packages, can be registered as a
trade-mark.”158  Indeed, courts generally did not even recognize product
154 See, e.g., Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Currey, 79 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Pa. 1948) (enjoining a
travelling performer not only from using the Lone Ranger name, but also from using the
appearance of the Lone Ranger); see also Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir.
1942); Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1883) (holding that Bel-
ford’s unauthorized reprinting of Mark Twain’s book did not infringe on the trademark
“Mark Twain”).
155 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
156 Id. § 109 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particu-
lar copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose
of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”).
157 Amanda Scardamaglia, Flashpoints in 3D Printing and Trade Mark Law, 23 J.L. INFO. &
SCI. 30, 44 (2015) (“3D printing and the registration of 3D shapes may open up old
wounds concerning the function of trade mark law, the rationale for the registration of
shapes and other non-conventional signs as trade marks, and the expansion of registrable
subject matter more generally.”).
158 Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 491–92 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886); see also Lucien Lelong, Inc. v.
Lenel, Inc., 181 F.2d 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1950) (“It is elementary that a color or container cannot
be a trade-mark.”); A.Y. McDonald & Morrison Mfg. Co. v. H. Mueller Mfg. Co., 183 F. 972,
974 (8th Cir. 1910) (“But one manufacturer cannot create a monopoly, to be by him
enjoyed, because he has adopted a shape or form of a product, and particularly when such
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packaging as a trademark.159  That categorical view obviously has evolved,
but not without significant struggle, largely because of the difficulty of sepa-
rating the source-designating function of product design features from the
other functions of the articles.160
Assertion of trademark rights in relation to digital goods brings all of
those challenges to the fore, and it puts pressure on central aspects of trade-
mark theory.  When should digital “goods” count as goods, and what sorts of
indications of those “goods” should be relevant to trademark law?
According to the standard account, trademarks provide information
about the source of goods primarily so that consumers can use the source
information to set expectations about the physical qualities or characteristics
of those goods.  As courts routinely say, trademark protection gives producers
incentives to offer goods of consistent quality.161  That is, as many working in
the law and economics tradition have told us, especially important for goods
with unobservable characteristics—features that aren’t apparent on normal
product is one of general use.”); E. Regensburg & Sons v. Juan F. Portuondo Cigar Mfg.
Co., 142 F. 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1905) (stating, as to a cigar-band product, “[c]ertainly the
color alone could not be appropriated by the complainant as a trade-mark, nor the shape
alone, nor the material alone; and even the combination of these three elements could not
make a valid trade-mark”); In re Dennison Mfg. Co., 39 F.2d 720, 720 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (“It is
well settled that the configuration of an article having utility is not the subject of trade-
mark protection.”); Adams, 31 F. at 280 (“It is well settled that a person cannot obtain the
monopoly incident to a trade-mark by the mere form of a vendable commodity that may be
adopted.  In this case the complainants could not obtain a trade-mark for the form of the
sticks of chewing gum they might manufacture . . . .”).
159 See, e.g., Sterling Remedy Co. v. Eureka Chem. & Mfg. Co., 80 F. 105, 107 (7th Cir.
1897) (“It is elementary that one may not exclusively appropriate the size and shape of a
package.”); Neuhoff Bros. v. Oscar Mayer Packing Co., 112 F. Supp. 68, 68 (N.D. Tex.
1953) (“A trade-mark cannot be a package, or, a container.”); Socie´te´ Anonyme De La
Distillerie De La Liqueur Benedictine De L’Abbaye De Fecamp v. Puziello, 250 F. 928, 928
(E.D.N.Y. 1918) (stating that “a trade-mark is a design or mark rather than a container or
package,” but noting that the plaintiff may have a cause of action for imitation of packag-
ing under a theory of unfair competition); Phila. Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Rouss, 40 F. 585, 587
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889) (“[I]n ordinary circumstances, the adoption of packages of peculiar
form and color alone, unaccompanied by any distinguishing symbol, letter, sign, or seal, is
not sufficient to constitute a trade-mark.”).
160 For a description of the persistent challenges in functionality doctrine, see Mark P.
McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823 (2011).
161 See, e.g., Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., Inc., 639 F.3d 788, 789 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1995));
see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW 168 (2003) (“In other words, trademarks have a self-enforcing feature.
They are valuable only insofar as they denote consistent quality, and so only a firm able to
maintain consistent quality has an incentive to expend the resources necessary to develop a
strong trademark. . . . A similar argument shows that a firm with a valuable trademark will
be reluctant to lower the quality of its brand because it would suffer a capital loss on its
investment in the trademark.”).
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inspection of the product but may relate, for example, to the quality of pro-
duction or “under the hood” elements.162
That theory of trademark law presumes that a mark owner produces, or
at least stands behind the production of, goods with which consumers inter-
act and for which consumers can hold the mark owner responsible for the
characteristics—otherwise there could be no incentive relating to the pro-
duction of goods.  This is why, in order to meet their quality control require-
ments, licensors typically are expected to inspect the physical products
offered under their mark, not simply the use of the mark itself.163
Digitization puts enormous pressure on this conception.  If “producers”
are now just “designers” and have little to no involvement with or responsibil-
ity for the production of tangible products, then the informational content
of trademarks will have to be understood quite differently.  In the ordinary
case, it seems unlikely that consumer expectations about the quality of the
tangible products will have much to do with the origin of the intangible
content.164
Take the example of a 3D printable file of a shoe.  Consumers may well
recognize (and perhaps even care) that the file depicts the design of a Nike
shoe, though that conclusion derives from an understanding that Nike in fact
produces physical shoes having that design.  But to the extent consumers
have the capacity to print the shoes themselves or through some intermedi-
ary, the more important question is whether consumers would know or care
whether Nike is the source of the particular digital file in which that design is
fixed, and what relationship that understanding would have to expectations
162 See, e.g., Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP.
523, 526–27 (1988) (“In many markets, sellers have much better information as to the
unobservable features of a commodity for sale than the buyers. . . . Unobservable features,
valued by the consumer, may be crucial determinants of the total value of the good. . . . [I]f
there is a way to identify the unobservable qualities, the consumer’s choice becomes
clear . . . . The economic role of the trademark is to help the consumer identify the unob-
servable features of the trademarked product.  This information is not provided to the
consumer in an analytic form, such as an indication of size or a listing of ingredients, but
rather in summary form, through a symbol which the consumer identifies with a specific
combination of features.”).
163 See, e.g., Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 45, 60 Stat. 427, 443 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (defining “related company” to mean “any
person who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registra-
tion in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which
the mark is used”); Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589 (9th Cir.
2002) (invalidating the mark for lack of consistent inspection of goods); Dawn Donut Co.
v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (requiring licensor to police
the activities of the licensee).
164 See Scardamaglia, supra note 157, at 44 (stating that 3D printing “may even lead to a
re-evaluation of the function of the trade mark beyond its economic function as a badge of
origin”).
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about the quality of any physical embodiment of the shoes that is derived
from the digital file.165
This is not to deny that consumers in some cases might value the content
very much, or even that they might care who created that content.  And in
that sense perhaps digitization pushes even harder on questions of attribu-
tion.166  But even if consumers are interested in knowing who created a
design, that does not mean they care about the origin of a particular copy of a
design, and that distinction matters enormously because trademark law is
hardly the only—or even the best—way of dealing with control over (or attri-
bution regarding) the design as such.167  In fact, we have an entire legal
regime devoted to incentivizing ornamental designs for utilitarian objects—
the design patent system168—and a copyright regime that encourages aes-
thetic creations.169  Focusing on the origin of physical goods is important if
we are to maintain the integrity of trademark law’s boundaries.
Indeed, increasing digitization might well mean less of a role for trade-
mark law and greater roles for copyright, utility patent, or design patent.
That is not to say that every digital good will, or should, enjoy patent or copy-
right protection; only that those other regimes will have to balance the bene-
fits of control against free competition in a manner relevant to the creation
of digital works.  There are obvious implications in that kind of shift for those
other areas of IP.170  But, in our view, those are implications that should be
165 Consumers, of course, may want to buy directly from a brand they like to show
support for it.  Consumers can be assured of buying directly from the brand owner by
shopping at the source, such as the brand owner’s webpage.  This again demonstrates why
indications external to the file continue to play an important trademark role with digital
files.
166 See Ginsburg, supra note 29; Heymann, supra note 38; Greg Lastowka, The Trademark
Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2005).
167 See Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789,
789 (arguing against modifications to copyright law to provide greater attribution rights on
the ground of its impracticability, noting that “identifying authors is beyond [copyright
law’s] grasp”).
168 Cf. U.S. Patent No. 385,220 (filed Oct. 21, 1997) (involving a design patent covering
the Volkswagen “bug” or “beetle” car).
169 We also do not deny that utilitarian design as embodied in a digital file will have an
effect on the 3D printed product.  A file containing a digital model of a car engine with a
misshaped piston will lead to a misshaped physical piston.  With traditionally manufac-
tured cars, consumers did not need to separate design from production: the purchaser
would blame the producer (e.g., Toyota), whether that producer actually designed the car
or not, because the producer stood behind production of the physical car.  With 3D print-
ing, users may care about safety, but that does not mean they care about the origin of the
actual copy of the file (as opposed to the origin of the design itself).  The costs of making
design safety a trademark issue as opposed to, or in addition to, a products liability issue
are high, as Dastar indicates.
170 See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 17 (detailing 3D printing technology’s effects
on patent law); Lemley, supra note 17; Osborn et al., supra note 15 (analyzing how digital
technology reduces the costs of innovation and thus calls into question the patent system’s
current balance); cf. Osborn, supra note 15 (analyzing 3D printing technology’s effects on
various aspects of the legal regime).
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dealt with, when necessary, in those other systems, rather than trying to shoe-
horn into trademark law concerns that increasingly might not fit well.
B. Blurring the Line Between Goods and Services
As we have noted, the Supreme Court decided Dastar at a time in which
goods were distributed primarily in physical form.  The Court’s emphasis on
the origin of tangible goods was therefore meant to distinguish between the
physical object sold in the marketplace and the intangible content that might
be fixed in that physical object.  But the Court clearly never had in mind
circumstances in which there was no physical reference point at all.
As commentators quickly pointed out, the Court’s framing ignored the
fact that section 43(a) refers to false designations of the origin of goods or
services.171  Given the nature of Fox’s claim, which wasn’t directed to services,
that oversight was understandable.  But since the Court’s approach empha-
sized tangibility and services are obviously necessarily intangible, courts have
struggled to determine Dastar’s applicability to claims involving services.172
That struggle is really not surprising, as the challenge of assimilating
service marks into a system traditionally focused on marks affixed to physical
goods is an old one.173  Indeed, prior to the Lanham Act, service marks
could be protected, if at all, only under unfair competition.174  Service marks
were such a conceptual misfit for trademark law that even in the years imme-
diately after the Lanham Act was passed, the Trademark Office remained
hostile, rejecting the earliest applications at a high rate.175  But in the latter
part of the twentieth century, as the economy continued to expand and
diversify and companies increasingly interrelated products and services, “the
boundary between products and services blurred.”176  With time, many
courts began to discount any serious distinction between goods and ser-
vices,177 except in the unique context of registration.178
171 Actually, the statute is even broader than that—it refers to use in commerce of “any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
172 See M. Arthur Gensler Jr. & Assocs. v. Strabala, 764 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2014).
173 See supra note 143.
174 See In re Radio Corp. of Am., 205 F.2d 180, 182 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (“Prior to the enact-
ment of the Lanham Act, no statutory authority was available to protect the owners of
service marks as such.”).
175 See Derenberg, supra note 150, at 841–45 (noting that, of the approximately 1300
service mark applications submitted by mid-1948, only ten were actually granted
registration).
176 Paul M. Schoenhard, Why Marks Have Power Beyond the Rights Conferred: The Conflation
of Trademarks and Service Marks, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 970, 979 (2005).
177 See, e.g., Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Int’l Select Grp., Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1334 n.1
(11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hile the distinction between a trademark and a service mark may be
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Although courts have never articulated a fully developed distinction
between goods and services, many pre-digital cases seemed not to require
one: handbags are goods, and financial advice is a service.179  Even software
was originally sold on CDs or diskettes, planting it firmly in the goods cate-
gory.  But as companies began to distribute software in downloadable form,
the distinction became less clear.  Now, the aptly named “software as a ser-
vice” model houses the software remotely in the cloud, allowing consumers
to interact with it on a subscription basis.  The same could be said of expres-
sive works like music and movies.  Once distributed in physical form, these
works are now downloaded or streamed, raising the question of whether pho-
tographs and videos delivered over the internet are goods or services.180
Dastar’s emphasis on physical goods elevates the distinction between
goods and services at the very same time that the digital revolution is putting
enormous pressure on that distinction.181  If trademark law treats goods and
services differently, plaintiffs will have a strong incentive to characterize
alleged infringers’ digital uses as indicators of the origin of services.  Indeed,
we can already see this with Phoenix Entertainment’s (previously Slep–Tone)
relevant for registration purposes, it is not particularly relevant for the purposes of the
likelihood of confusion analysis.”); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814
F.2d 812, 815 n.1 (1st Cir. 1987) (“We may refer to them collectively as ‘marks,’ which
include both trademarks and service marks.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982)); Bos. Prof’l
Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1009 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Ser-
vice mark infringement and trademark infringement are governed by identical standards.
The terms can be used interchangeably when the marks are both service marks and
trademarks.”).
178 For application purposes an applicant must situate its goods or services within one
or more classes, and for that reason the distinction can be important. In re Jobdiva, Inc.,
843 F.3d 936, 941(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[C]areful analysis is required to determine whether
web-based offerings . . . are products or services . . . .”); cf. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis
Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015) (“The usages listed in the application— i.e., those
goods on which the mark appears along with, if applicable, their channels of distribution—
are critical.” (first citing 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 55, § 20:24; then citing id. § 20:15)).  But
philosophically in the United States, registration does not create rights; they exist based on
use.  Further, the same basic rights attach whether U.S. trademark law categorizes some-
thing as a good or service. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 191
n.1 (1985) (stating that the Lanham Act “generally applies the same principles concerning
registration and protection to both trade and service marks” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1053
(2012))).
179 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK MAN-
UAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1402 (Jan. 2017 ed.) [hereinafter TMEP].
180 See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 543,
572–73 (D.N.J. 2003) (referring, without discussion, to the Internet streaming of movie
trailers as goods); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc., No. CIV. A. 96-6961,
1998 WL 767440 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1998) (not clearly stating whether delivery of pictures
over the internet, some for viewing and others for purchase, constitutes delivery of goods
or services (or both)).
181 See JobDiva, 843 F.3d 936, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith modern technology, the
line between services and products sometimes blurs.” (citing JobDiva, Inc. v. Jobvite, Inc.,
No. 92050828, 2015 WL 3542849, at *2 (T.T.A.B. May 20, 2015))).
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lawsuit against additional karaoke companies in the Southern District of
Texas.182  In its latest complaint, Phoenix emphasizes its own service marks
and focuses its claims on the defendants’ infringing “services.”183
One solution to this problem would be for courts to develop better rules
for meaningfully differentiating goods and services.  Courts could, for exam-
ple, start with the Trademark Office’s extensive rules for ascertaining
whether an applicant should be permitted to register a mark as a service
mark.184
The problem with that approach is that the Trademark Office’s rules
haven’t succeeded in producing clarity in the difficult emerging cases.  In In
re JobDiva,185 for example, JobDiva initially registered two service marks for its
software, which it supplies to customers in connection with personnel place-
ment and recruitment services.186  The software “generally provides a
database of employment applications that a hiring manager or recruiter
might use to fill a job opening.”187  The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB) cancelled the registrations on the ground that JobDiva did not use
the marks in connection with services because it only used the marks to iden-
tify the software, a good.  More particularly, the Board held, JobDiva did
nothing in addition to supplying the software, and that did not qualify as
offering a service.188  The Federal Circuit reversed, faulting the Board for
using a “bright-line rule” by requiring JobDiva to show it supplied services
other than the software, rather than asking whether JobDiva delivered the
software as a service (i.e., hosted the software itself).189
As JobDiva illustrates, the problem of distinguishing goods from services
isn’t merely lack of adequate rules; it is instead that digital technology calls
the distinction itself into question.  As courts and scholars in areas as dispa-
rate as tax,190 products liability,191 and commercial law192 have already dis-
covered, if there ever was an ontological difference between goods and
182 See Complaint, Phoenix Entm’t Partners, LLC v. Boyte (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2016)
(No. 4:16-cv-02911).
183 See, e.g., id. at ¶ 8 (indicating that the defendant operates a business “at least one
purpose of which is to provide karaoke-related services”).
184 See, e.g., In re Advert. & Mktg. Dev., Inc., 821 F.2d 614, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (defin-
ing a service broadly as “the performance of labor for the benefit of another” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting In re Canadian Pac. Ltd., 754 F.2d 992, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1985))); In re
Television Digest, Inc., 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 505 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (finding that services nor-
mally incidental to production or sale of goods are not registerable as services); Ex parte
Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 165 (Comm’r Pat. & Trademarks
1958) (applying the “goods in the trade” rationale in refusing to issue a trademark registra-
tion for printed forms used in rendering banking services); TMEP, supra note 179,
§ 1301.01(a) (stating a test for what constitutes a registerable service).
185 843 F.3d 936 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
186 Id. at 937.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 939.
189 Id. at 937, 941.
190 See Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); Digital
Goods and Services Tax Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1860, S. 971, 112th Cong.
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services, it’s simply harder to conceive of it now.  Products liability law and
commercial law have both attempted to tackle the issue, sometimes suc-
cumbing to the temptation to put the new wine of the digital era into the old
wineskins of pre-digital categories without considering theory or policy.193
Given these fundamental difficulties, courts can’t avoid the services problem
in the trademark context simply by drawing a brighter line.  They need
instead to functionally evaluate a claim that focuses on services to determine
whether it alleges a false designation of a service distinct from the offering of
content.
Indeed, courts have in a number of cases rightly resisted claims that
merely attempt to evade Dastar by recharacterizing as services conduct that is
fundamentally directed at the origin of intangible content.194  As these
courts have recognized, plaintiffs’ claims should be barred when they allege
confusion about the origin of services and the services merely consist of pro-
viding intangible content.  A movie theater that shows a public domain movie
produced by MGM cannot be subject to an infringement claim if MGM sim-
ply alleges that the presence of the MGM lion at the beginning of the film
causes confusion about the source or sponsorship of the theater’s entertain-
ment services.  For the same reason, Slep–Tone’s claims should be barred to
the extent the services it alleges are falsely designated consist of providing
karaoke tracks, and that should be true regardless of the format in which
either party distributes the tracks.  Claims involving parties providing access
to movies or 3D printable files should fall in the same category.
191 Whether software constitutes a product or service under strict liability regimes has
engendered considerable debate. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB.
§ 19 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (collecting older sources); Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability
for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 434 (2008);
Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for Defects in an Industry
That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 745, 745 n.1, 756
nn.57–58 (2005) (collecting sources).  Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code only
covers transactions in goods, which it defines essentially as “all things . . . which are mova-
ble at the time of identification to the contract for sale.”  U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (AM. LAW INST.
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
192 Scholars and courts have long debated whether and when software constitutes a
good under the UCC. See, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 25–27 (6th ed. 2010); Jean Braucher, Contracting out of Article 2 Using a “License”
Label: A Strategy That Should Not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 268–271
(2006); Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853 (1986).
193 See Osborn, supra note 15, at 568–69 (noting a gap in the analysis of software under
products liability law).
194 See Phx. Entm’t Partners, LLC v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2016); see also
Aviation Fin. Co. v. Chaput, No. 14 Civ. 8313; No. 14 Civ. 8315, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32043, at *58 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2015) (“Although Dastar was decided in the context of
tangible goods, its reasoning applies equally well to reverse palming off of services”); cf.
LaFrance, supra note 49, at 254–55 (noting the ease with which certain cases can be
described as involving either goods or services).
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So should have the plaintiff’s claims in Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc.195  In
that case, Craigslist alleged that the defendant aggregated and republished
Craigslist’s online advertisements by scraping the listings “in real time,
directly from the Craigslist website” so as to “essentially replicate[ ] the entire
craigslist website.”196  The court refused to dismiss the false designation of
origin claim, notwithstanding Dastar.197  Among other things,198  the court
distinguished Dastar on the ground that it only held that goods must be tangi-
ble, while Craigslist alleged that defendants’ use of the mark “create[d] the
false and misleading impression that Defendants’ products or services are pro-
vided by craigslist.”199  According to the court, the mere presence of an alle-
gation regarding services was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
But the services at issue in that case consisted only of the aggregation
and delivery of content (database entries of items for sale).  Thus, Craigslist’s
allegation that the defendant was passing off its services amounted to a claim
that it was falsely designating the origin of the content, or that the content
was the subject matter that falsely indicated the source of the site.  On either
interpretation, Dastar should have applied and barred the claim.200
Somewhat more difficult, but still in our view barred by Dastar, are
claims of false designation of the origin of ancillary services provided by the
defendant where the source of those services is alleged to be indicated by use
of a mark within intangible content provided by the defendant.  So, for
example, a restaurant that shows a movie that includes the production com-
pany’s trademark cannot be liable for causing confusion as to the source or
sponsorship of its services, notwithstanding the superficial focus on restau-
rant services.
We acknowledge, however, that the situation with respect to services is
more complicated than with respect to goods, as use of service marks in the
digital context does in some cases implicate real trademark concerns.  Con-
sider the use of the Chase marks on the website at chase.com.
195 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
196 Id. at 966.
197 See id. at 977–80.
198 The court also said that Dastar was inapplicable because Craigslist alleged passing
off rather than reverse passing off.  “Craigslist allege[d] that Defendants used the ‘craig-
slist’ mark to falsely pass off Defendants’ products as being provided or endorsed by Craig-
slist.”  Id. at 978.  Thus, the court reasoned, the claim did not “raise the ‘perpetual patent
and copyright’ concerns that the Supreme Court identified in Dastar,” as the claim “relates
to Defendants’ content, not Craigslist’s.”  Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003)).  But of course Craigslist’s
allegation was precisely that defendant’s content was Craigslist’s content.
199 Id. at 979 (quoting First Amended Complaint at 30, Craigslist, 942 F. Supp. 2d. at
962 (No. 3:12-cv-03816)).
200 If, on the other hand, the defendant had created a website that attempted to trick
the user into thinking it was actually Craigslist’s site, such as by telling users they were at a
site operated or endorsed by Craigslist and using Craigslist’s marks in places external to
the digital files, the case would fall into the second category, and Dastar would not bar
consideration of the marks.
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FIGURE 5
Here the website is really a conduit for the underlying financial services, and
the Chase mark identifies the source of those services.  Because the website is
a creative work, a broad rule prohibiting any consideration of service marks
embedded in creative content would preclude a Lanham Act suit against a
third party that “spoofs” (i.e., deceptively imitates) the original website.  But
unlike claims that allege that use of a mark within creative content cause
confusion about the origin of the content itself, a claim based on use of the
Chase mark on the fake website alleges confusion about the origin of the
financial services for which the website is merely a conduit.  That sort of
claim does not represent an attempt to control the content as such.  Thus, in
our view, courts should not read Dastar to preclude claims in which marks—
although embedded in a creative work—indicate the origin of services per-
formed through the website.
This kind of distinction ought to have informed the court’s analysis of
Microsoft and various financial institutions’ lawsuit against the organizers of
the Shylock botnet.201  The Shylock botnet hijacked users’ computers,
allowing remote users to control the computers and to extract sensitive per-
sonal information from them.202  Shylock is able to change the Windows
operating system files of a user’s computer and can display fake webpages to
users, tricking them into divulging information.203
Microsoft and its co-plaintiffs alleged that use of their trademarks by the
botnet violated the Lanham Act.  Entering a default judgment, the court
agreed, finding infringement because the “botnet generates and uses unau-
thorized copies of Microsoft’s [and the financial institutions’] registered and
201 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–8, No. 1:14-cv-811, 2015 WL 4937441 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 17, 2015) (phishing); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(spam emails that used AOL in the header).
202 Microsoft, 2015 WL 4937441, at *6–7.
203 Id. at *7.
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famous trademarks . . . . During a Shylock attack, these counterfeit marks
deceive computer users into believing they are using legitimate versions of
the Windows operating system and are accessing Plaintiffs’ bona fide web-
sites.”204  The court also found that because users’ computers may run slower
when infected, customers “may attribute poor performance by Microsoft
software.”205
But of what goods or services did the marks used by the botnet indicate
the source?  To the extent the marks simply indicated the origin of software
or a website, one might legitimately ask whether the claim related to the
software’s intangible origin (i.e., whether the content is genuine).  If they
did, then they should have been barred by Dastar.  The claim might not be
barred, however, if the botnet’s uses of the various trademarks, particularly
those of the financial institutions whose websites were mirrored, can be seen
as falsely designating the origin of the underlying services of those institu-
tions—services available through the websites.
As this analysis implies, courts will need to be sensitive to the particular
services of which the origin is alleged to have been falsely designated.  Where
the claims, however denominated, really assert the right to control content,
they should be barred by Dastar.  Claims that plausibly allege false designa-
tion of other services, even if perhaps offered through a creative web site,
should not be barred.  Similarly, Dastar will often not bar claims based on
advertisements of services, even though the advertisements themselves are
creative works.  A billboard or a television commercial, for example, will
often constitute a creative work.  But allegations of infringement based on
misleading use in those advertisements focus on designation of the origin of
the services advertised, not the content of the advertisement.206
CONCLUSION
Just as they have in many other areas of law, digital technologies chal-
lenge central principles of trademark law.  In particular, digitization puts sig-
nificant pressure on trademark law’s traditional orientation toward
indications of the origin of physical goods.  As technology enables the radical
separation of the design of goods from their production, trademarks may
increasingly be unnecessary to identify the producers of those goods.  Con-
sumers may themselves be the producers.  But reorienting trademark law to
204 Id. at *11.
205 Id.
206 Nor would Dastar bar false advertising claims when the allegations relate to false
statements of fact regarding characteristics of the goods or services advertised.  Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 38 (“If, moreover, the producer of
a video that substantially copied the Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion, to
give purchasers the impression that the video was quite different from that series, then one
or more of the respondents might have a cause of action—not for reverse passing off
under the ‘confusion . . . as to the origin’ provision of § 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresen-
tation under the ‘misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities’ provision of
§ 43(a)(1)(B).” (alterations in original)).
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indications of the origins of intangible designs would collapse important dis-
tinctions between trademark law and copyright and design patent.
We argue that courts should apply the Supreme Court’s Dastar decision
to reinforce those distinctions, permitting claims in the digital context only
when consumers are likely to be materially confused about the origin of the
digital file itself, and barring claims that really focus on the origin of any
content fixed in that digital file.  To make that rule meaningful, courts also
should insist that the allegedly false designation be external to the file.  Plain-
tiffs should not, in other words, be able to claim confusion about the origin
of a digital file based on its content.  Finally, while digitization also signifi-
cantly complicates the distinction between goods and services, courts should
apply Dastar to bar claims of false designation of the origin of services when
the claim is really about the origin of the creative work.
